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Is There a Constitutional Right to
Select the Genes of One’s Offspring?
Andrew B. Coan*
The Supreme Court has long recognized a due process right to make deeply personal
decisions such as whether to bear or beget a child. Might this right extend to selecting
the genes of one’s offspring? Perhaps more important, should courts interpret it to do
so? Thus far, discussion of these questions has focused almost exclusively on the
normative goals that a constitutional commitment to procreative liberty should be
taken to embrace. That is undoubtedly an important issue, but it cannot tell us whether
courts are the institution best suited to carry any particular goal into effect. This is a
basic but frequently overlooked point in constitutional analysis and one that has
received next to no attention in the context of assisted reproductive technologies. This
Article begins to remedy the oversight. In so doing, it has two overlapping goals: to
enrich the constitutional analysis of emerging issues in reproductive liberty and to use
those issues as a vehicle for exploring the complexities of institutional analysis more
generally.

* Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School. Thanks to Mitch Berman, Alta
Charo, Anuj Desai, Jaime Staples King, Neil Komesar, Jonathan Masur, Julian Mortenson, Richard
Primus, John Robertson, and Larry Sager for helpful comments.
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Introduction
For the past four decades in the United States, “reproductive
freedom” has largely been shorthand for a woman’s right to terminate
her pregnancy without governmental interference. That is about to
change—not this year or next, but soon.
Already a number of technologies allow prospective parents some
measure of control over the chromosomal and genetic makeup of their
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offspring. These range from techniques for preconception sex selection to
2
preimplantation genetic diagnosis of embryos to prenatal tests for
3
assessing the genetic makeup of a developing fetus. In the case of
prenatal testing, the only genetic control afforded parents is the option
not to have offspring with a particular genetic or chromosomal makeup,
exercised through selective abortion. At some point in the future,
prospective parents might also have the option of creating and
implanting embryos through somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning, which
would share the same genome as another human being, or of engaging in
germ-line genetic manipulations, to knock out undesirable genes or
4
introduce desirable ones.
With the exception of prenatal testing, which is used in some form
in a substantial majority of pregnancies, the presently available
technologies are expensive and have been used relatively infrequently,
primarily to avoid the birth of children with very serious heritable
diseases like Tay-Sachs and chromosomal abnormalities like Down
Syndrome. But geometric advances in knowledge of the human genome
and improvements in genetic-testing techniques will soon create the
option of testing—and selecting—for a much broader range of genetic
traits (though almost certainly fewer than have been imagined in some
5
science fiction scenarios). This prospect has generated an extraordinary
amount of controversy, with dramatic headlines warning of “designer
6
babies,” “neoeugenics,” even a “posthuman future.”

1. The most reliable is flow cytometry, which uses a fluorescent dye to sort sperm by sex. All
eggs carry a female sex chromosome, so it is the sex chromosome of the fertilizing sperm that
determines the sex of any resulting child. See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to
Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 Am. J.L. & Med. 7, 12 (2004) [hereinafter Robertson, Harm to
Offspring].
2. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis, or PGD, involves the biopsy and genetic or chromosomal
analysis of a single cell from an embryo created through in vitro fertilization. In vitro fertilization, in
turn, involves harvesting eggs from a woman’s ovaries and fertilizing them in a Petri dish for later
implantation in the uterus. See Jaime King, Predicting Probability: Regulating the Future of
Preimplantation Genetic Screening, 8 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 283, 290–91 (2008).
3. The most familiar is amniocentesis, which involves the needle extraction of amniotic fluid
from the uterus and analysis of the genetic material therein. See Amniocentesis, Am. Pregnancy
Ass’n, http://www.americanpregnancy.org/prenataltesting/amniocentesis.html (last visited Oct. 31,
2011).
4. Both of these techniques, however, are a very long way from clinical use and may never prove
safe or practically feasible. See King, supra note 2, at 298–300.
5. Commonly hypothesized examples include hair and eye color, deafness, homosexuality,
athletic ability, physical beauty, and intelligence. See id. at 300 (describing impending advances). The
major constraint on expansion of genetic selection is that all existing—and indeed, foreseeable—
techniques require the use of in vitro fertilization, which is invasive, modestly risky for mother and
child, imperfectly successful, and above all, expensive. The one exception is preconception sex
selection, which can be accomplished through the much simpler and cheaper expedient of artificial
insemination. See Robertson, Harm to Offspring, supra note 1, at 12.
6. See, e.g., Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future 17 (2002) (coining this memorably
alarmist term); cf. Sonia M. Suter, A Brave New World of Designer Babies?, 22 Berkeley Tech. L.J.
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Calls for regulation—or outright prohibition—have come from
7
8
groups as diverse as Christian conservatives and leftist communitarians,
both concerned about the risk of turning children into deliberately
manufactured commodities; the disability-rights community, concerned
that selection against children with disabilities will reduce respect for
9
existing persons with disabilities; and some feminists, concerned that
women will be pressured by their male partners and doctors into
undergoing physically and emotionally burdensome medical procedures
10
against their own best interests. But opponents of genetic selection face
a problem: The Supreme Court has long recognized a due process right
to make deeply personal decisions such as whether to bear or beget a
11
child.
12
Might this right extend to selecting the genes of one’s offspring?
Perhaps more important, should the courts interpret it to do so? These
are difficult questions, on which a substantial and growing body of
literature has sprung up over the past fifteen years. There is much of
interest in this work. Thus far, however, it has been focused almost
exclusively on the normative goals a constitutional commitment to
procreative liberty should be taken to embrace. This is an important
issue, to be sure. But however it is resolved, the question remains
whether courts are the institution best suited to carry any particular goal
into effect. To answer that question requires not just careful scientific,
policy, and philosophical analysis of the interests implicated by genetic
selection, but also close and systematic attention to the comparative
competence of courts and other potential decisionmaking institutions.

897, 922–23 (2007) [hereinafter Suter, A Brave New World] (discussing the term “neoeugenics”). See
generally President’s Council on Bioethics, Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of
Happiness (2003).
7. See, e.g., Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance: Why We Should Ban the Cloning of
Humans, 32 Val. U. L. Rev. 679, 687 (1998).
8. See, e.g., Michael J. Sandel, Public Philosophy 207–09 (2005) (arguing that some forms of
genetic selection may “erode our appreciation of life as a gift”); Michael J. Sandel, The Case Against
Perfection, Atlantic Monthly, Apr. 2004, at 50, 54 (similar).
9. See, e.g., Tim Stainton, Missing the Forest for the Trees? A Disability Rights Take on Genetics,
13 J. Developmental Disabilities 50 (2007). But see Adrienne Asch, Disability Equality and Prenatal
Testing: Contradictory or Compatible?, 30 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 315, 341 (2003) (expressing grave
concerns about the implications of PGD for disabled persons but ultimately “accepting consumerism
in the reproductive marketplace”).
10. See, e.g., Janice G. Raymond, Women as Wombs: Reproductive Technologies and the
Battle over Women’s Freedom ix (1993); Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive
Technology and Reproductive Equality, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1457 (2008).
11. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992); Carey v.
Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972).
12. Here and henceforward, I leave to one side prenatal (as opposed to preconception and
preimplantation) genetic screening, which for constitutional purposes is best understood as sui generis,
both because of its close linkage with abortion and its exceptionally widespread use.
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This is a basic but frequently overlooked point in constitutional analysis
and one that has received next to no attention in the existing literature
14
on assisted reproductive technologies.
This Article begins to remedy the oversight. In so doing, it has two
overlapping aims. The first is to deepen the constitutional analysis of
emerging issues in reproductive liberty. The second is to use those issues
as a vehicle for exploring the complexities of institutional analysis more
generally. My pursuit of these aims proceeds as follows. Part I briefly
surveys the existing law and academic commentary on the
constitutionality of regulating genetic selection. Its central conclusion is
that existing law neither compels nor precludes recognition of a
15
constitutional right to select the genes of one’s offspring. The operative
question, therefore, is whether courts should extend the right to
procreative liberty recognized in prior decisions to the context of genetic
selection. Part II considers the two leading academic approaches to that
question, using their neglect of institutional issues to demonstrate the
centrality of such issues to sound constitutional analysis. Put simply,
virtually any view on the proper scope of reproductive liberty in the
abstract is consistent with a variety of constitutional rules—ranging from
no judicial protection to very strong judicial protection—depending on
the relative institutional competencies of courts and other potential
decisionmakers.
With this insight in mind, Part III turns back to the relevant case
law, reconstructing from it an implicit framework for institutional
analysis that other commentators have largely missed. Under that
framework, the case for recognizing a constitutional right to select the
genes of one’s offspring is weak. The Court’s approach, however, leaves
much to be desired. It is tentative, incomplete, ad hoc, and impressionistic.
Part IV therefore turns to the leading academic alternative, a variation
on rational-choice theory, which is far more systematic. Applying that
approach to the regulation of genetic selection yields much useful
information. But it also reveals several important and previously
overlooked difficulties in using this approach as a basis for normative

13. See Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics,
and Public Policy 49 (1994) [hereinafter Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives] (“An analysis based
solely on goal choice can never reach conclusions about law and public policy. Any institutionally
sophisticated reader confronted with a goals-based analysis . . . can always offer a valid two-word
response: ‘So what?’”); Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty 1 (2006) (similar).
14. The one partial exception I am aware of is Rao, supra note 10. For an assessment of the
promise and limitations of her reproductive equality approach, see generally Andrew Coan, Assisted
Reproductive Equality: An Institutional Analysis, 60 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1143 (2010).
15. For the sake of convenience, I will use the terms “constitutional right” and “judicially
enforceable constitutional right” interchangeably. I do not mean to imply that the two are in fact
equivalent. It is simply that my interest here is confined to whether and when the courts should
recognize a constitutional right to procreative liberty.
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constitutional analysis. Part V addresses several of these difficulties in
depth.
All of this leaves constitutional analysts and especially judges in a
pretty pickle. The Article concludes with some thoughts on how each of
these groups might proceed in light of the substantial institutional
complexities facing them. Most important is the need for greater
dialogue on institutional issues, both among academics and between
academics and judges.

I. A Hazy Shade of Liberty
The scope of the constitutional right to procreative liberty and the
extent of its application to genetic-selection decisions is, in a nutshell,
16
unclear. No Supreme Court case since the long-discredited Buck v. Bell
has squarely addressed the existence of a due process right to procreate.
Nor have the lower courts considered the issue in any depth. There is,
however, dicta in several Supreme Court decisions stating that the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments includes “the right of the individual . . . to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
17
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”
Elsewhere, the Court has famously described procreation as “one of the
basic civil rights of man. . . . fundamental to the very existence and
18
survival of the race.” And as recently as 2003, the Court reaffirmed that
“our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
19
relationships, child rearing, and education.”
These statements would provide a plausible precedential basis for
the Supreme Court to recognize a broad right to procreative liberty
extending to all manner of genetic-selection techniques. But that is by no
means the only way to read the relevant precedents. Most of the Court’s
pronouncements on procreative liberty were made in decisions involving
20
abortion and contraception. A handful of others were made in the
context of mandatory surgical sterilization, intimate personal association,
and important child-rearing decisions, all by politically disfavored

16. 274 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1927) (rejecting procedural and substantive due process challenges to
mandatory sterilization of the “feeble-minded”).
17. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 923 (1992); see also Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 565 (1989); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169–70 (1973);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
18. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); see also Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464, 472 n.7 (1977).
19. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
20. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977); Roe, 410 U.S. at 164;
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453–54; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
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minorities. In most instances, the courts that made them were not
thinking about a right to procreate (as opposed to a right not to
procreate), much less a right to choose the genes of one’s offspring in the
process. To argue for a constitutional right extending to genetic selection
solely on the basis of such dicta would violate what Richard Posner has
aptly described as “Lesson Number One in the study of law”: that
“general language . . . must not be ripped from its context to make a rule
far broader than the factual circumstances which called forth the
22
language.” The Supreme Court made a similar point in Washington v.
Glucksberg: “That many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the
sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal
23
decisions are so protected.”
Of course, to say that precedent does not compel recognition of a
right to engage in genetic selection is not to say it precludes it. Indeed, in
some ways, both the logic and the language of the cases seem to invite
courts to extend protection to new and emerging technologies in genetic
selection. The rhetoric of the opinions is sweeping, and the right to
choose the genes of one’s offspring certainly shares important attributes
in common with the intimate decisions the Court has already accorded
constitutional protection. Like abortion, contraception, and intimate
sexual association, decisions relating to genetic selection are deeply
personal—in many cases, they are made in the context of marriage or
another intimate relationship—and they will frequently affect an
24
individual or couple’s decision whether to reproduce at all. Even where

21. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (invalidating a criminal prohibition on homosexual sodomy);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (upholding the right of the Amish to withdraw their
children from public schools); Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541–42 (invalidating a mandatory sterilization law
that applied to chicken thieves but not embezzlers); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35
(1925) (invalidating a compulsory public education law as applied to students of Catholic parochial
school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400–01 (1923) (invalidating a state law against teaching
German to elementary students).
22. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O’Neil, 809 F.2d 350, 354 (7th. Cir. 1987). Compounding the
uncertainty is a competing line of authority—competing, that is, with the Griswold/Roe/Casey line—
that would deny recognition of any new liberty rights not firmly grounded in long-standing tradition.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123
(1989) (plurality opinion); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 558.
23. 521 U.S. at 727.
24. To take an extreme example, imagine a couple deciding whether or not to have a third child
where both prospective parents are known carriers of a devastating autosomal recessive disorder like
Tay-Sachs disease. The resulting child would have a one-in-four chance of suffering from the disease.
How many such couples would have another child without the option of some type of genetic
screening? Surely a sizeable number would be unwilling to take the risk. Cf. John A. Robertson,
Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 421, 424–25 (1996) [hereinafter
Robertson, Genetic Selection] (noting the potentially decisive impact of genetic-selection technologies
on the decision whether to reproduce).
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that is not the case, genetic-selection decisions are in many, if not all,
respects comparable to the sort of important child-rearing decisions the
Court has long accorded special protection. Choosing a child’s genes, like
25
26
teaching her German, sending her to parochial school, or giving her an
27
Amish upbringing, is one way for parents to shape her identity and
28
future life course.
The important question is thus the normative one: Not is there a
constitutional right to engage in some or all forms of genetic selection,
but should there be? Not surprisingly, a growing number of
commentators have turned their attention to this question in recent
29
years, offering a wide variety of answers. Their general approach,
however, is strikingly similar, and can be loosely described as
30
Dworkinian. Proponents of a broad right seek to identify a morally
attractive rationale for the Court’s past reproductive liberty decisions—
for example, a broad vision of individual autonomy with regard to
intimate, self-regarding reproductive decisions—that extends to most or
31
all genetic-selection decisions. Opponents of such a right, by contrast,
attempt to explain the Court’s past decisions narrowly, by virtue of some
individual interest (commonly, bodily integrity or sexual equality)
implicated by abortion and contraception but not by genetic-selection
decisions, or, alternatively, by virtue of some government interest
present in the genetic-selection context but absent from abortion and
contraception decisions (such as anticommodification concerns or
32
protecting the dignity of the disabled). The argument is not that the
existing right to procreative liberty could not be stretched to encompass
genetic selection but rather that the best moral justification of the cases
33
does not extend so far.

25. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
26. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 515.
27. Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
28. See Robertson, Genetic Selection, supra note 24, at 436.
29. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive
Technologies 157–60 (1994); Carter J. Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative Right, 10 Yale Hum. Rts. &
Dev. L.J. 1, 6 (2007); King, supra note 2, at 328–29; Rao, supra note 10, at 1460; Robertson, Genetic
Selection, supra note 24, at 478–79; Sonia M. Suter, The “Repugnance” Lens of Gonzales v. Carhart
and Other Theories of Reproductive Rights: Evaluating Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 76 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1514, 1520 (2008) [hereinafter Suter, The Repugnance Lens].
30. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 413 (1986) (“Law’s attitude is constructive: it aims,
in the interpretive spirit, to lay principle over practice to show the best route to a better future.”).
31. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Assisting Reproduction, Choosing Genes, and the Scope of
Reproductive Freedom, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1490, 1490 (2008) [hereinafter Robertson, Assisting
Reproduction].
32. See, e.g., Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive Technology,
45 UCLA L. Rev. 1077, 1101–07 (1998); Suter, The Repugnance Lens, supra note 29, at 1598.
33. See, e.g., Rao, supra note 24, at 1462–68 (acknowledging that procreative liberty decisions
could be read as extending to genetic selection); Suter, The Repugnance Lens, supra note 29, at 1530–
36 (same). Dworkin, of course, insists that the existing right to procreative liberty (or any other right)
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II. The Importance of Institutions
There is a core problem with this approach. In focusing exclusively
on the balance of individual and government interests in geneticselection decisions, its adherents confuse two questions. The first is when
and whether it would be desirable for reproductive decisions to be
protected in the abstract. The second is when and whether it would be
desirable for courts, in particular, to protect them. Both are important
questions and well worth addressing. But they raise sharply different
issues and will often have different answers. A sound approach to
normative constitutional analysis must attend to both and be careful to
distinguish between them.
Consider the two leading positions on the constitutionality of
regulating assisted reproductive technologies. The first, espoused most
34
eloquently by John Robertson, I shall call the libertarian approach. As
the name suggests, libertarians favor broad (though not unlimited)
constitutional protection for personal decisions connected to procreation.
Robertson, for example, has variously argued for a presumptive right to
procreative liberty extending to (1) decisions furthering “traditional
35
reproductive goals,” (2) decisions “most people view as central” to
36
reproductive liberty, (3) decisions implicating the values and interests
37
that make reproduction a valued activity, and (4) decisions essential to
38
an individual or couple’s choice whether or not to reproduce. In each of
these cases, he suggests, regulation is permissible only if supported by an
39
important or compelling state interest. Although Robertson is not
always explicit on the point, this view appears to rest on a combination of
political morality and analogical reasoning from the Court’s prior
decisions.
The second leading approach, of which Sonia Suter’s recent work is
representative, we can call communitarian. Again, as the name suggests,
communitarians attach greater importance to the potential social harms
of unfettered reproductive liberty and less importance to the right of
atomistically conceived individuals to do whatever they please in the

is defined by the best moral justification of the cases and consequently requires whatever that
justification requires. This is his famous “one right answer” thesis. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Hard
Cases, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1081–82 (1975). It is their deviation from this thesis that makes the
leading arguments in the reproductive technologies literature only loosely Dworkinian.
34. I use the term in its original, small “l” sense, as in “one who approves of or advocates liberty.”
Oxford English Dictionary 884 (2d ed. 1989). Robertson is not a libertarian in the sectarian political
or strict philosophical sense.
35. Robertson, Harm to Offspring, supra note 1, at 32.
36. Robertson, Genetic Selection, supra note 24, at 431.
37. Robertson, Assisting Reproduction, supra note 31, at 1490.
38. John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 Am. J.L. & Med. 439, 474
(2003) [hereinafter Robertson, Era of Genomics].
39. See, e.g., id. at 454; Robertson, Genetic Selection, supra note 24, at 428.
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sphere of procreation without regard to its effects on others. In the
context of genetic selection, for example, communitarians have been
especially concerned about effects on family relationships resulting from
the commodification of reproduction and the devaluation of disabled
persons whose genes are selected against. In light of these concerns,
communitarians favor a constitutional principle Suter calls relational
autonomy, which “understands [reproductive] autonomy in terms of the
relationships that define us” and balances the effects of reproductive
40
decisions on individuals, families, and the community at large. Like
Robertson, Suter is less than explicit about the premises of this view but
appears to base it on a moral reading of applicable Supreme Court case
law.
For all their differences, the libertarian and communitarian positions
share one important feature in common: They are both silent on the
question of institutional choice. Both simply assume that courts should
enforce the principles that they—the libertarians and communitarians,
41
respectively—have identified as attractive in the abstract. This takes for
granted what is not at all obvious: that courts will perform well enough
relative to other potential decisionmakers for this to be the most sensible
course of action.
Consider what the libertarian position demands of courts. Under
one of Robertson’s formulations, the class of regulations courts should
subject to heightened scrutiny turns on “what most people view as
42
central to reproductive meaning.” Under another, courts would be
charged with determining which decisions implicate the values and

40. Suter, The Repugnance Lens, supra note 29, at 1598; see also Suter, A Brave New World,
supra note 6, at 954.
41. It might be objected that this assumption is justified—perhaps even required—by Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), and the well-settled place of judicial review in the American
constitutional order. On this view, questions of comparative institutional competence have already
been settled in favor of courts on a wholesale basis and therefore need not be reexamined retail. One
could certainly imagine a system of constitutional review organized in this fashion. But in the system
we have, neither Marbury nor the nominally settled practice of judicial review takes one very far.
Nothing in either the case or the practice resolves the standard of review courts should apply to the
constitutional decisions of political actors. Nor does either identify with any precision the class of
decisions subject to review in the first place. It should not be terribly surprising, then, that courts
refuse to subject the vast majority of political decisions to any meaningful degree of constitutional
scrutiny. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 13, at 232. Moreover, in determining which
small fraction of decisions should receive such scrutiny, institutional considerations are pervasive. See
infra Part III. To be clear, this not to say that all institutional questions are always up for grabs. In
many instances, the answers are already baked into the pie of settled law. But in contexts like genetic
selection, where existing law is unsettled, institutional questions are both open and analytically
unavoidable. In some instances, these questions may be best resolved by extending some pre-existing
division of institutional responsibility, but as the remainder of this Part illustrates, that must be
demonstrated; it cannot be assumed.
42. Robertson, Genetic Selection, supra note 24, at 431.
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interests that make reproduction a valued activity. Under any
formulation of the libertarian position, courts would be required to
determine which state interests are compelling and how likely, as an
empirical matter, they are to be threatened by the class of regulated
activity.
In each of these tasks, it seems obvious that courts would make
mistakes. To take just one example, judges are deliberately insulated
from political pressures and also tend to be substantially older, wealthier,
whiter, and better educated than the general population (not to mention
44
predominantly male), making them a curious choice to determine what
most people view as central to reproductive liberty. Judges also seem
unlikely as a group to possess any special competence for determining
which values and interests give reproduction its profound significance or
which state interests are sufficiently compelling to justify interfering with
it. Perhaps more important, they lack any specialized expertise in social
psychology, genetics, or sociology that might be expected to give them
special insight into the empirical likelihood of social impacts like
commodification of children or devaluation of the disabled in connection
with complex and rapidly evolving reproductive technologies.
Of course, the relevant question is comparative. And the political
branches of both the state and national governments, whose work
product courts review in constitutional cases, have serious shortcomings
of their own. They may possess greater resources for discerning popular
views than courts, but they are frequently more responsive to small but
45
well-organized interest groups than to the broad public. Legislators and
executive officials might, at an individual level, be at least as competent
as judges to resolve difficult questions of political morality. They almost
certainly have greater psychological and scientific expertise at their
disposal, should they choose to call upon it. Perhaps most important,
they also have the option of delegating regulatory authority to
administrative agencies staffed with such expertise specifically in mind.
On the other hand, their electoral accountability forces legislatures to
give strong weight to public views that are often deeply ignorant and
46
analytically confused. This problem seems likely to be especially
pronounced with respect to emerging technologies like genetic selection,

43. See Robertson, Assisting Reproduction, supra note 31, at 1490.
44. See, e.g., Bureau of Int’l Info. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Outline of the U.S. Legal
System 154–55 (2004).
45. This, of course, is a core tenet of public choice theory, on which the classic statement is made
by George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. Mgt. Sci. 3, 3 (1971).
46. See generally Michael X. Delli Carpini & Scott Keeter, What Americans Know About
Politics and Why It Matters (1996); Arthur Lupia & Matthew D. McCubbins, The Democratic
Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? (1998); John R. Zaller, The Nature
and Origins of Mass Opinion (1992).
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which are not only new but also the subject of fantastical science-fiction
47
scenarios that seem to have greatly distorted public understandings.
Whether these shortcomings are more or less serious than the
shortcomings of courts in the particular context of procreative liberty is a
difficult question. The answer might vary with the ethical and scientific
complexity (as well as the public salience) of the particular use of genetic
48
selection at issue. But the question must be answered before we can say
one way or another whether a strong, judicially enforceable constitutional
right to procreative liberty is a sensible way to carry the libertarian vision
into effect.
In this regard, it bears emphasis that judicial fallibility in discerning
the precise boundaries of a libertarian right (or in striking the
appropriate balance between that right and other competing interests)
does not necessarily argue for weaker judicial enforcement. If courts are
likely to systematically overestimate competing societal interests, the
solution may be to jettison the compelling interest test in favor of an
absolute right. Alternatively or in addition, courts might systematically
underestimate the range of interests that make reproduction a valued
activity. In that case, libertarians might favor a maximally broad
conception of procreative liberty as a prophylactic. Of course, the
opposite is also possible. If the political branches are likely to perform
49
well and courts are likely to overprotect a libertarian right, a rule of no
constitutional protection might be best even on libertarian grounds.
The same point holds for the communitarian position, which asks
courts to enforce a constitutional right of relational autonomy, balancing
the effects of reproductive decisions on individuals, families, and the
community at large. Here too it seems obvious that courts will make
mistakes, and for many of the same reasons. Courts lack the fact-finding
tools and the social science expertise to perfectly or even reliably assess
the broad societal effects of particular reproductive decisions. And even
if they could perform this aspect of their task well, judges lack any
special philosophical training that would allow them to competently
determine what moral weight to assign to different effects. Of course, the
relevant question is again comparative, and again, legislatures and

47. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Is There a Constitutional Right to Clone?, 53 Hastings L.J. 987, 996,
1005 (2002) (discussing the scientific misconceptions that appear to underlie public unease about
reproductive cloning).
48. This explains why it is necessary to consider the institutional question even if we take as given
the existing right of procreative liberty in coital reproduction. There is a very real possibility that the
balance of institutional competence may shift as we move from issues near the core of a wellestablished and uncontroversial right of long historical standing to issues of greater moral (and
attitudinal) uncertainty and greater technological complexity.
49. Such over-protection could take either of two forms: (1) invalidating regulation which is in
fact justified by compelling societal interests, or (2) extending a right to activity outside the bounds of
procreative liberty, properly understood.
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executive bureaucracies have many shortcomings of their own. Whether
courts would do worse or better from a communitarian perspective by
recognizing a judicially enforceable right to relational autonomy is a
difficult question but one that must be answered to assess the case for
such a right.
An intriguing possibility is that both legislative and judicial
decisionmakers would perform so poorly that courts would do better by
recognizing a broad libertarian right to reproductive liberty. This would
have the effect of allocating decisionmaking authority to private
citizens—or, speaking in more institutional terms, the market. At first
blush, the suggestion seems radically counterintuitive. The
commodification and disability-rights problems that most concern
communitarians are classic externalities that unregulated reproductive
decisionmakers would have little incentive to factor in to their decision
calculus. But the political process and the courts, too, might take
insufficient account of these interests—indeed this seems likely,
especially for disability rights—while simultaneously undervaluing
individual and family interests, which communitarians also see as
important. If the problem were sufficiently severe, a strong libertarian
right to procreative liberty might better serve communitarian values than
50
would a weaker, more flexible right to relational autonomy.
The possibility of this kind of overlapping consensus between
apparently competing normative views has greatly interested many
institutionalists. If comparative institutional analysis can generate
agreement on a single constitutional rule, they point out, we might be
able to dispense with some divisive normative debates altogether. At the
very least, we should be able to identify greater areas of overlap between
51
opposing sides. This is a powerful point, to which Part V will return at
some length. It is important to note, however, that the dynamic can
operate in both directions. If institutional analysis has the potential to
bring competing normative views closer together, it also has the potential
52
to drive them further apart. An example is the possibility, noted above,
that judicial fallibility might inspire libertarians to scrap the compelling
interest test in favor of an absolute right to procreative liberty. On purely
normative grounds, both libertarians and communitarians support
50. It is easy to imagine the political process banning the use of genetic selection by deaf persons
and achondroplastic dwarves to ensure the birth of children that share their disabilities, while
permitting selection to avoid the birth of children with those and other disabilities. If imperfect courts
would uphold such a ban under a communitarian rule of relational autonomy but strike it down under
a strong libertarian right, disabled persons as a class might well be better off under the latter.
51. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L.
Rev. 885, 889 (2003) (“[I]nstitutional analysis may . . . allow interpreters who hold different
commitments to converge on particular interpretive rules while bracketing disagreements about their
preferred first-best accounts.”).
52. As far as I can tell, this point has been completely overlooked in the literature.
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regulations of procreative liberty necessary to serve compelling societal
interests. But once we take account of the possibility that courts applying
this test will uphold too much regulation (by libertarian lights), views on
this point might well diverge. In such circumstances, institutional analysis
makes the choice between normative goals more consequential, not less,
though institutional analysis is still essential to determining how any
particular goal would be realized most effectively in practice.

III. A Second Look at the Cases
The preceding discussion demonstrates that institutional choice is
analytically central to sound normative analysis of constitutional
decisionmaking. This Part shows that it is also necessary to provide a
persuasive account of the Supreme Court’s prior decisions concerning
reproductive liberty. That is to say, even if we accept the quasiDworkinian approach of existing commentators, those commentators
ignore the dimension of the Court’s case law that is perhaps most
relevant to explaining its implications for genetic selection: comparative
institutional competence. This Part aims to cure the oversight. Part III.A
takes a second look at the relevant decisions, reconstructing the implicit
institutional analysis undergirding them. Part III.B then applies that
analysis (without endorsing it) to assess the constitutionality of
regulating genetic selection. In so doing, I hope to underscore the
centrality of institutional analysis to actual constitutional practice and
also to set the stage for Part IV, which critiques the Court’s approach
and explores the promise and limitations of the leading academic
alternative.
A. The Court’s Implicit Institutional Analysis
Read carefully, the Court’s decisions concerning reproductive
liberty reveal a far greater sensitivity to institutional issues than
academic commentators have displayed. At the most basic level, this
sensitivity manifests itself in the quite narrow set of laws subject to
heightened substantive scrutiny under the Due Process Clause. Of
particular note, courts have left many other freedoms at least equal in
importance to reproductive, sexual, and child-rearing liberty to the
political process. The rights of terminally ill persons to access
53
experimental drugs and to control the circumstances of their own
54
deaths are among the most striking examples. What could be more

53. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 697 (D.C.
Cir. 2007); cf. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 558–59 (1979) (rejecting a terminally ill
patient’s claimed statutory right to access unapproved drugs).
54. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 808–09 (1997) (upholding a state criminal prohibition against
“assisting” a suicide); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735–36 (1997) (similar holding).
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central to the “the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of
55
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life” than the
decision whether to go gentle into that good night? And if we expand
our field of vision to include positive rights, the right to a minimal level
of economic welfare—in effect, the right to feed oneself and one’s
offspring—seems at least comparable in importance to the right to
choose whether to have offspring in the first place. Yet courts have
consistently refused to recognize any of these rights as fundamental for
purposes of due process analysis.
Why constitutionalize a right to procreative, sexual, and childrearing liberty when so many other vital liberties go unprotected, at least
by courts? For the reasons just mentioned, the answer cannot plausibly
be that this right is more fundamental or more central to personal
autonomy. Nor can it be that a right to procreative, sexual, and childrearing liberty is more firmly grounded in the constitutional text or
original understanding. It plainly is not. The most plausible principled
explanation is that courts have felt institutionally better positioned to
protect this right—at least in the context of forced sterilization,
contraceptives, and abortion—than other normatively plausible
candidates for constitutional protection. Why might this be the case?
And would (or should) this institutional judgment extend to the right of
parents to select the genes of their offspring, even assuming the Court
saw this right as implicating the same liberty interests as contraception,
abortion, intimate sexual association, and child rearing?
The cases provide few explicit answers, but they do offer some
intriguing hints, especially if we look not just at the opinions of the Court
but at the pattern of results. Four in particular stand out. Together, these
four factors form a kind of implicit framework for institutional analysis.
To be clear, I do not claim that the Justices always have such a
framework in mind or that they ever conceive of it in exactly the way it is
presented here. Nor do I claim that this framework represents an
especially attractive or rigorous approach to institutional analysis. My
claim is only that it offers the most plausible principled explanation for
the Court’s decisions in this area. The discussion below substantiates this
claim for each of the four factors that make up the framework.
1. History
First, the Court has frequently emphasized established historical
traditions both as a matter of rhetoric and as a matter of practice.
Perhaps the most famous example is Justice Harlan’s statement in his
Poe v. Ullman dissent that the balance struck by the Due Process Clause
is “the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history
55. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the
56
traditions from which it broke.” Harlan went on to cite the “utter
[historical] novelty” of Connecticut’s criminal contraceptive ban as
57
“conclusive” evidence against its constitutionality. More recently, in
Washington v. Glucksberg, a majority of the Court expressly placed
historical traditions at the heart of the substantive due process analysis.
“[T]he Due Process Clause,” Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, “specially
protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively,
58
deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” Concluding that “a
consistent and almost universal tradition . . . has long rejected the
asserted right” of competent terminally ill adults to assistance in ending
their own lives, the Court refused to subject Washington’s ban on
59
assisted suicide to heightened due process scrutiny.
Of course, history might be relevant to the due process inquiry for
any number of reasons. Perhaps the meaning of the Due Process Clause,
properly understood, requires reference to history to determine the
60
scope of its protection. Call this the positive function of history in
61
constitutional analysis. Alternatively, or in addition, long-standing
historical traditions might be thought to embody the accumulated
wisdom of previous generations, which ought not to be disregarded
absent very compelling reasons. Call this the epistemic function of
62
history. Each of these uses of history has enthusiastic judicial and
academic proponents, but neither use is capable of capturing the full
picture.
Indeed, in Glucksberg itself, the Court explains its reliance on
historical tradition in interpreting the Due Process Clause primarily in
institutional, rather than positive or epistemic, terms. In particular, the
Court touts a historical approach to the scope of constitutionally
protected liberty as serving two institutional functions: First, such an
approach “tends to rein in the subjective elements that are necessarily
63
present in due process judicial review.” Second, “by establishing a
threshold requirement . . . it avoids the need for complex balancing of
56. 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 554.
58. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21 (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Id. at 723.
60. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State
Constitutions When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted
in American History and Tradition?, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 7 (2008).
61. I have adapted this handle from Richard Primus. See Richard Primus, The Necessity and Peril
of Ethical History, Constitution in 2020 (Sept. 18, 2009, 10:09 AM), http://www.constitution2020.org/
node/82 (“History deployed as positive authority purports to settle the meaning of clauses or doctrines
by reference to things that happened in the past.”).
62. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process Traditionalism, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1543, 1550 (2008)
(noting the “epistemic credential” of historical traditions).
63. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722.
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64

competing interests in every case.” Whether these arguments are
ultimately persuasive is open to question. History, like the fundamental
65
status of particular liberties, is often in the eye of the beholder. Nor is it
obvious that history represents the only, or the most substantively
66
attractive, available constraint on judicial subjectivity. And of course,
serious historical inquiry carries its own substantial complexities to which
courts are arguably quite ill suited. For present purposes, however, the
important point is that the Court’s own explanation for relying on history
plainly reflects concerns about the institutional capacity of courts rather
than the true meaning of the Due Process Clause or the actual balance of
individual and government interests.
2. Public Consensus
Second, the Court has very seldom recognized a new judicially
67
enforced liberty right in the face of strong public opposition.
Undoubtedly, this is partly and perhaps primarily a by-product of the
politics of the appointment and confirmation process. Justices appointed
by elected presidents and found acceptable by a majority of elected
senators (indeed, at some level, a supermajority, given the theoretical
possibility of filibuster) are unlikely to be far outside the mainstream of
national opinion. Still, in numerous contexts the Court explicitly takes
note of the number of states that permit or prohibit particular practices,
as a rough proxy for contemporary public attitudes. The most prominent
of these is the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, where in two
recent decisions it struck down state death penalty laws after concluding
that states on the whole were trending away from executing juvenile and
68
mentally retarded offenders, respectively. Another recent example of
69
more direct relevance to procreative liberty is Lawrence v. Texas. In
striking down a Texas ban on same-sex sodomy, Justice Kennedy relied
heavily on “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives
in matters pertaining to sex,” substantiated in part by the small number
of states that continued, as of 2003, to criminally punish homosexual
70
sodomy. As Corinna Barrett Lain has recently shown, this sort of

64. Id.
65. Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 570 (2008), with id. at 636 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (offering competing historical accounts of the Second Amendment).
66. See Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1567–68 (raising doubts on both points).
67. See generally Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has
Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution (2009).
68. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (juvenile offenders); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 321 (2002) (the mentally retarded).
69. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
70. Id. at 572–73.
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polling of states is pervasive in the constitutional doctrine and
71
particularly in the Court’s fundamental rights decisions.
Again, the pattern of state laws might be relevant to the due process
inquiry in a number of ways. Perhaps the meaning of the Due Process
Clause, properly understood, requires reference to contemporary moral
72
consensus for which the pattern of state laws is a plausible proxy.
Alternatively, or in addition, the pattern of state laws might be thought
to reflect a kind of Condorcetian collective wisdom as to which rights are
73
actually fundamental in a moral-philosophical sense. Obviously, these
functions are closely analogous to the positive and epistemic functions of
history in constitutional analysis. But as with history, neither captures the
full picture. The positivist rationale cannot explain the Court’s frequent
insistence on exercising its own independent judgment even after
74
identifying a consensus among the states. The Condorcetian rationale
also appears nowhere in the Court’s opinions and, from a normative
standpoint, is deeply problematic because a legal consensus among states
will seldom satisfy the independence condition of Condorcet’s jury
75
theorem.
A more plausible explanation, both descriptively and normatively, is
that the Justices survey state laws as a kind of crude inoculation against
the countermajoritarian difficulty. As the least democratically accountable
branch of government, the Court may well feel compelled—by prudence,
democratic values, or both—to confine its more textually free-wheeling
exercises of judicial review to cases where a national majority supports
76
(or is at least not strongly opposed to) the result. One reasonably
71. Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards,” 57 UCLA L. Rev. 365,
374–75 (2009) (“[T]he Court [has] polled the states in deciding the right to physician-assisted suicide
for terminally ill competent adults, the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, the right to
parental recognition of a child born into another couple’s marriage, and the right of custodial parents
to make visitation decisions regarding their children and natural grandparents.”).
72. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711 (1997) (“[T]he primary and most
reliable indication of [a national] consensus is . . . the pattern of enacted laws.”) (quoting Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 373 (1989)).
73. In its simplest form, the Condorcet Jury Theorem holds as follows: Where each member of a
group makes an independent judgment about a binary question, each of which is more than fifty
percent likely to be correct, the chance that a majority of the group will be right approaches one
hundred percent as the group gets larger. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal
Theory, 1 J. Legal Analysis 1, 4–6 (2009). At least one prominent commentator has suggested that
this “wisdom of crowds” could explain the Court’s practice of counting states. See Cass R. Sunstein, If
People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 155 (2007).
74. See Andrew B. Coan, Well Should They? A Response to If People Would be Outraged by
Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 213, 225 (2007).
75. See id. at 230 (noting the probable inapplicability of the Condorcet Jury Theorem to state
penal laws).
76. Cf. Richard Primus, Double-Consciousness in Constitutional Adjudication, 13 Rev. Const.
Stud. 1, 2 (2007) (“[T]he strongly held view of the public is sometimes an ingredient of the right
answer to a constitutional question, just like text, precedent, history, structure, social science, and
normative theory.”); Coan, supra note 74, at 233–39 (tentatively endorsing a similar argument).
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reliable way of doing this is to refrain from invalidating practices
77
endorsed and actively engaged in by a majority of states. One may
question the wisdom of this approach. Indeed, many have done so.
Entrenching present practices against future political change might
78
squelch valuable state-level experimentation. Alternatively, keeping
judicial review basically majoritarian might confine that power to the
79
cases where it is least necessary. But again, for present purposes, the
important point is that this explanation—that public consensus functions
as a safeguard against the countermajoritarian difficulty—reflects an
institutional judgment quite separate from the constitutional merits,
however defined.
3. Empirical Questions
Third, the Court (and lower courts as well) has been especially
reluctant to recognize new constitutional rights where doing so would
require it to make complex empirical assessments, especially about broad
scientific or sociological questions. This is not to say that courts never
80
make complicated empirical judgments. They plainly do. But where
some other government institution has already made such a judgment
and especially where that institution has established a specialized process
for doing so, courts have generally been quite reluctant to override that
81
process on constitutional grounds. A particularly pertinent recent
example is the D.C. Circuit’s refusal to recognize a substantive due
process right of terminally ill persons to use experimental drugs that have
82
passed Phase I clinical trials. Because all other treatment options had
been exhausted, the dissenting judges argued that FDA regulations
limiting access to such drugs unconstitutionally denied the plaintiffs
83
medical care necessary to preserve their lives. But as the majority
77. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023–26 (2010) (invalidating juvenile life without
parole for nonhomicide offenses based on a survey of state sentencing practices rather than state
sentencing laws).
78. See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using State
Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1089, 1091–92, 1106 (2006)
(“Constitutionally enshrining the views of a majority of states robs the remaining states of their
capacity to determine policy in a central area of constitutional law.”).
79. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 68–69
(1980) (“[I]t makes no sense to employ the value judgments of the majority as the vehicle for
protecting minorities from the value judgments of the majority.”).
80. See generally David L. Faigman, Constitutional Fictions: A Unified Theory of
Constitutional Facts (2008) (discussing the pervasiveness of legislative fact disputes in constitutional
cases).
81. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007) (collecting cases giving “state and federal
legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific
uncertainty”).
82. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 697 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
83. Id. at 715, 719 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
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pointed out, whether any given drug is necessary to the survival of
terminally ill patients or would in fact subject them to horrible side
effects with no therapeutic benefit is an empirical question to which it is
84
impossible to know the answer before clinical testing is complete. In the
face of such uncertainty, the court deferred to the FDA’s judgment that
the risks of permitting broad early access outweighed the benefits.
This was not the only course available. The court could have
attempted to assess the risks and benefits itself. But like most other
courts facing similar situations, the D.C. Circuit concluded “that the
democratic branches are better suited to decide the proper balance
between the uncertain risks and benefits of medical technology, and are
85
entitled to deference in doing so.” That this represents a judgment of
comparative institutional capacities, rather than a balancing of interests
or an interpretation of constitutional text, seems fairly clear. One might
quibble that such deference is only appropriate where a court reads the
Constitution as affirmatively requiring it, as the D.C. Circuit did here.
But if the reason for reading the Constitution in this way is a judgment of
comparative institutional competence (perhaps intermediated by an
inference about how the Constitution must have meant to allocate
interpretive authority in such circumstances), the qualification makes
little difference. Either way, courts frequently view the (supposedly)
inferior fact-finding capacities of courts as a compelling reason not to
disturb the judgments of other institutions on complex empirical
86
questions of broad social import.
4. Politically Vulnerable Groups
Fourth, virtually all of the Court’s decisions recognizing new
constitutional rights to sexual, reproductive, and child-rearing liberty can
be explained as an effort to protect politically disadvantaged groups.
Perhaps the most obvious example is the Court’s protection of same-sex
intimacy in Lawrence v. Texas, which invalidated a state law specifically
87
targeting a historically despised subgroup for criminal punishment.

84. Id. at 708–09 n.15 (majority opinion).
85. Id. at 713. Glucksberg’s refusal to recognize a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide
plausibly could be defended on similar grounds. Whether such a right would have enhanced or
reduced the autonomy of terminally ill persons as a group is a close and contested empirical question,
which legislatures and administrative agencies may well be better suited to decide than courts. See
generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106 Yale L.J. 1123 (1997) (arguing against a
constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide on this ground).
86. For a helpful overview of this judicial practice and the complex comparative institutional
judgments that underlie it, see Stephanie Tai, Uncertainty About Uncertainty: The Impact of Judicial
Decisions on Assessing Scientific Uncertainty, 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 671 (2009).
87. See 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The Texas sodomy law ‘raise[s] the
inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons
affected.’”); id. at 574–75 (majority opinion) (describing O’Connor’s argument as “tenable” but too
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Similarly, the abortion regulations invalidated in Roe v. Wade and
Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania imposed a
unique burden on women, one many commentators (and several
Supreme Court Justices) view as fundamentally inconsistent with
88
women’s equal participation in civic and social life.
Somewhat less obviously, the Court’s most famous child-rearing
liberty decisions can also be explained by a felt need to protect
disfavored ethnic and religious minorities from a malfunctioning political
89
process. Meyer v. Nebraska involved the rights of German immigrant
parents to transmit German culture to their children in the aftermath of
90
91
92
World War I, while Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Yoder v. Wisconsin
involved the rights of persecuted or powerless religious minorities to
provide their children a distinctively religious education. Finally, Skinner
v. Oklahoma involved the right of criminals to be free from
93
discriminatory forced sterilization. Although often remembered as a
substantive due process case, Skinner was actually decided explicitly on
equal protection grounds. Indeed, in the context of the American
eugenics movement, the Court apparently understood the mandatory
sterilization law it invalidated as a form of genuine race discrimination,
targeting a genetically disfavored and politically marginalized underclass
94
of petty criminals.
Equality, of course, is an important constitutional value as a matter
of substance. And each of the decisions just discussed could be seen as an
illustration of the equal citizenship or anticaste principle many
commentators take as central to the meaning of the Equal Protection
95
Clause. Certainly, that is a significant dimension of these decisions. It
would border on perverse, however, to ignore the leading explanation of

narrow).
88. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 Const. Comment. 291, 319–28
(2007); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261, 276–77, 350, 371–79 (1992); see also Gonzales v.
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
89. See, e.g., Rao, supra note 10, at 1466 (making this point). But see Nelson Lund & John O.
McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1555, 1566, 1569 (2004)
(criticizing this “misinterpretation” of the child-rearing liberty decisions for obscuring their original
foundations in the liberty of contract).
90. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
91. 68 U.S. 510 (1925).
92. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). A similar but less famous example is Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S.
284 (1927) (invalidating a federal law banning Japanese-language schools in the Hawaiian territory).
93. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
94. See Victoria F. Nourse, In Reckless Hands: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA and the Near Triumph
of American Eugenics (2008) (recovering this forgotten history). Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), may seem like an exception to this pattern. But of course, a ban on contraceptives, like the
abortion laws struck down in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), increases the risk of unwanted
pregnancies, the burden of which is born predominantly by women.
95. See generally, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2410 (1994).
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the Court’s special concern for politically disadvantaged minorities:
namely, that prejudice against such groups “may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
96
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.” This statement
comes from the famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene
Products Co., which in fact cites both Pierce v. Society of Sisters and
Meyer v. Nebraska as examples of the sort of political process failure that
97
might trigger a “more searching judicial inquiry.”
Here again, the wisdom of the Court’s approach may be disputed.
Perhaps diffuse majorities, beset by collective action problems, are in
greater need of judicial protection than concentrated minorities, whose
98
small size and relative cohesion confer organizational advantages. Or
perhaps courts attempting to correct political malfunctions will fail even
more spectacularly (albeit differently and for different reasons) than the
99
institutions whose decisions they are reviewing. The important point,
for now, is that the Court’s self-perceived comparative advantage in
protecting politically disadvantaged groups has profoundly affected the
scope of personal liberty protected under the Constitution’s Due Process
Clauses.
B. Putting It All Together
The foregoing discussion shows that institutional analysis has played
an important, though often implicit, role in the Court’s past decisions on
reproductive liberty and related issues. That analysis, as I have tried to
emphasize, is hardly above criticism. Nevertheless, it supplies a useful
starting point for approaching the question that academic commentators
have thus far ignored: Given their strengths and weaknesses relative to
other institutional decisionmakers, should courts in particular protect a
constitutional right to select the genes of one’s offspring in some or all
100
cases?
96. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938); see also Ely, supra note
79, at 221.
97. 304 U.S. at 152–53 n.4. For an attempt to recover and rehabilitate a somewhat different
institutional role for constitutional equality, see V.F. Nourse & Sarah A. Maguire, The Lost History of
Governance and Equal Protection, 58 Duke L.J. 955, 965 (2009) (“The idea is not simply that the law
has misclassified or used spurious generalizations (modern notions of equality); the idea is that general
laws are superior to special ones because of what they do within the legislative process—they link
representatives to those they represent.”).
98. Cf. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 723–24 (1985)
(“Other things being equal, ‘discreteness and insularity’ will normally be a source of enormous
bargaining advantage, not disadvantage, for a group engaged in pluralist American politics.”).
99. Indeed, severe political malfunctions can themselves make it substantially more difficult, and
in some cases impossible, for courts to improve on the political process. See Neil K. Komesar, Law’s
Limits: The Rule of Law and the Supply and Demand of Rights 76 (2001) [hereinafter Komesar,
Law’s Limits].
100. As a theoretical matter, different uses of genetic selection could implicate different
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Applying the Court’s analysis in Glucksberg, the answer would
seem to be no. While the practice of genetic selection has been largely
unregulated since its inception, the technologies involved have been in
101
clinical use for a few decades at most. Thus, a right to select the genes
of one’s offspring is not in any plausible sense “deeply rooted in this
102
Nation’s history and tradition.” To be sure, such a right might be
analogized to the traditional right to choose one’s spouse, which is a way
of choosing the genes of one’s offspring. It might also be analogized to
the traditional right of parents to make important child-rearing decisions,
to which genetic selection bears some similarities. But this sort of
reasoning seems inconsistent with Glucksberg’s insistence on a “careful,”
103
which is to say narrow, description of the asserted liberty interest. That
insistence, of course, was crucial to the Court’s express hope that
historical tradition would constrain judicial policy making.
Glucksberg thus appears to argue against recognition of a
constitutional right to select the genes of one’s offspring, at least for the
time being. But Glucksberg does not stand alone. As Roe v. Wade and
Lawrence v. Texas demonstrate, the Court has not treated the absence of
a deeply rooted historical tradition as a decisive objection to the
protection of new liberty rights. Indeed, in both Roe and Lawrence,
tradition was far more strongly on the side of regulation than is the case

institutional considerations just as they implicate different individual and government interests. As a
practical matter, however, this is generally not the case, at least under the Court’s analysis. The few
exceptions are noted specifically in the discussion below.
101. The one exception is amniocentesis, which has been used for prenatal screening for more than
fifty years and is thoroughly embedded in American obstetric practice. Ruth Schwartz Cowan,
Women’s Roles in the History of Amniocentesis and Chorionic Villi Sampling, in Women and
Prenatal Testing: Facing the Challenges of Genetic Technology 35, 36 (Karen H. Rothenberg &
Elizabeth J. Thomson eds., 1994). Up to this point, I have tried to put the issue of prenatal testing to
one side, due to its close entanglement with abortion. But it is not entirely possible to do so here.
Amniocentesis has been in use long enough and widely enough without substantial regulation (at least
separate from abortion) that one could plausibly argue that the right to use it is deeply rooted in
history and tradition. Of course, for these same reasons, no state is likely to prohibit amniocentesis or
similar forms of prenatal testing, so the issue is unlikely to come before the Court. Nevertheless, it
might seem odd to permit regulation of genetic-selection techniques that do not require the
destruction of a fetus (which is most of them) while techniques that do (all forms of prenatal testing)
are in widespread and unchallenged use (and are perhaps constitutionally protected as part of the
abortion right). The appearance is deceiving. Although there is certainly some overlap, abortion in
conjunction with amniocentesis obviously involves different interests than other forms of genetic
selection, most notably bodily integrity and gender equality. It is also used almost exclusively to avoid
the birth of children with very serious heritable diseases and would be highly impractical for genetic
enhancement uses. Any tradition of permitting it would therefore provide at most limited support for
a constitutional right to engage in other forms of genetic selection.
102. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)); see also Sunstein, supra note 47, at 990 (making a similar point in connection
with reproductive cloning).
103. 521 U.S. at 721.
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104

for genetic selection, where there is no deeply rooted tradition of any
kind because the technology (and thus the liberty) in question is
relatively new. In both Roe and Lawrence, however, other institutional
factors favored recognition of a new constitutional right. To begin with,
at least a plurality of the public supported the result in both cases,
substantially diminishing, if not eliminating, the countermajoritarian
105
difficulty. Perhaps more important, in both Roe and Lawrence the
Court’s decision removed significant barriers to the equal participation
of historically disadvantaged groups—barriers which themselves
reflected the historical marginalization of these groups in the political
106
process. Finally, neither decision turned centrally on complex empirical
107
judgments about broad social questions. On each of these scores, the
institutional case for a constitutional right to select the genes of one’s

104. This is not to suggest that the history in either case was uncomplicated or one-sidedly
proregulation. As to abortion, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973) (“[R]estrictive criminal
abortion laws . . . are not of ancient or even of common-law origin. Instead, they derive from statutory
changes effected, for the most part, in the latter half of the 19th century.”). As to same-sex intimacy,
see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 569–72 (2003) (noting that laws specifically targeting same-sex
sodomy are a relatively recent phenomenon in the United States); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 631, 643–65.
105. See Samantha Luks & Michael Salamone, Abortion, in Public Opinion and Constitutional
Controversy 80, 85–86 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008) (documenting that there has been at least
plurality support for Roe v. Wade since 1974); Frank Newport, Six Out of 10 Americans Say
Homosexual Relations Should be Recognized as Legal, Gallup News Service, May 15, 2003,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/8413/six-americans-say-homosexual-relations-should-recognized-legal.aspx
(reporting poll results demonstrating sixty percent support for decriminalizing same-sex sodomy).
106. See supra notes 88–89.
107. With respect to Roe v. Wade, this statement requires some qualification. While the basic
conflict raised by abortion regulation—between fetal life and a woman’s personal liberty—is
empirically relatively uncomplicated, two aspects of the Court’s decision in Roe have required courts
to confront complex medical questions. The first is the need to fix the point of fetal viability, at which
Roe and subsequent decisions have held that the state’s interest in protecting fetal life supersedes a
woman’s liberty interest in terminating her pregnancy. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878–79 (1992); Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65. The second is the need to determine the
proper scope of the maternal health exception Roe and subsequent decisions have required even for
postviability abortions. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 878–79; Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–65. As to viability, the
Court has mostly avoided the need to grapple with complicated medical questions itself by requiring
that viability be determined by a physician case by case (though it has upheld some state regulation of
this process, without getting into the science). See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490, 530 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). As to the maternal health exception, the Court has
historically taken a similar (if less explicit) approach of delegating medical judgments to physicians.
See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65. In Stenburg v. Carhart, however, the Court allowed itself to be drawn into
a medical controversy over whether intact dilation and extraction (so-called “partial birth”) abortions
are ever necessary to protect maternal health. 530 U.S. 914, 937–38 (2000). The Court backed off
somewhat in Gonzales v. Carhart, reviewing congressional fact findings on this question “under a
deferential standard” but also insisting on its obligation to render independent judgment. 550 U.S. 124,
165 (2007). These limited and equivocal interventions in complex empirical disputes suggest that the
Court’s commitment to correcting gender bias in the political process is strong enough to overcome its
general deference on technical scientific matters, at least at times.
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offspring compares unfavorably to the case for a woman’s right to choose
or any individual’s right to engage in same-sex intimacy.
As to popular support, attitudes differ markedly depending on the
form of genetic selection in question. Some—including, at a minimum,
108
reproductive cloning and germ-line genetic engineering —are the
109
objects of widespread abhorrence. Others, such as sex selection and
genetic enhancement uses of preimplantation screening, provoke
110
conflicted reactions at best.
Views on medical applications are
substantially more sympathetic, especially where genetic selection is used
111
to avoid the birth of children with catastrophic illness or disability. But
for courts to draw a constitutional line between medical and nonmedical
uses would require them to grapple with complex empirical questions of
the sort that they have generally preferred to leave to the political
branches. Among others, these would include questions related to gene
112
penetrance and the differential susceptibility hypothesis, which holds
that certain genes known to produce serious disorders in some
113
environments can confer great advantages in others. Courts would also
need to consider the potential expressive impacts of such line drawing on
existing persons living with the conditions that parents would be
114
constitutionally entitled to select against.
Still, holding all else equal, support for medical applications may be
strong enough to weigh in favor of a limited constitutional right restricted

108. Recall that germ-line genetic engineering, which is a long way from technological feasibility,
involves the manipulation of embryonic DNA to knock out undesirable genes or introduce desirable
ones.
109. A variety of polls conducted between 1993 and 2003 showed widespread opposition to human
cloning. See Matthew C. Nisbet, Public Opinion About Stem Cell Research and Human Cloning,
68 Pub. Opinion Q. 131, 150–53 (2004).
110. See, e.g., Kathy L. Hudson, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: Public Policy and Public
Attitudes, 85 Fertility & Sterility 1638, 1641 (2006) (reporting forty-five percent male support and
thirty-five percent female support for nonmedical sex selection).
111. Id. (reporting sixty-eight percent support for PGD to select embryos free from fatal childhood
disease). Given this fact, a ban targeting medical genetic selection specifically seems unlikely. But a
broader ban prohibiting all genetic selection, including selection for medical purposes, is within the
realm of possibility, as are (in at least some states) regulations of in vitro fertilization that would
functionally prevent medical screening. These are the cases where a constitutional right would most
likely matter in practice.
112. Gene penetrance is the frequency with which genes linked to particular conditions or traits
express themselves phenotypically (that is, physically). See King, supra note 2, at 287–88 n.19. The
difficulties of measuring penetrance and of communicating complicated statistical concepts to patients
have been suggested as possible reasons for regulating some types of medical selection.
113. See, e.g., Jay Belsky et al., For Better and For Worse: Differential Susceptibility to
Environmental Influences, 16 Current Directions Psychol. Sci. 300 (2007). For an elegant popular
treatment, see generally David Dobbs, Orchid Children, Atlantic Monthly, Dec. 2009, at 50.
114. See Asch, supra note 9, at 337 (“If prenatal testing and embryo selection are not intended to
give messages about which types of children the society will accept and welcome, proposals for
‘drawing lines’ about the types of tests to be offered or withheld must be . . . rejected.”).
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to these uses. It does not hurt that few states presently regulate genetic
selection in any substantial way—a consideration the Court has often
found to weigh in favor of constitutional protection. Of course, standing
alone this fact does little to distinguish medical applications from other
forms of genetic selection that the public strongly opposes, which are
116
also largely unregulated. Moreover, this sort of state polling seems
likely to be a far less reliable safeguard against the countermajoritarian
difficulty in the context of new technologies that are just emerging into
117
widespread use and still evolving rapidly. Some law, after all, must be
the first to address a new problem. With respect to medical applications,
however, there is more than just an absence of regulation. There is also
the long-standing, widespread, and largely unregulated use of prenatal
118
testing for basically similar purposes. This may be enough to reassure
judges that a limited constitutional right to engage in medical selection
would not meet with strong public opposition.
When it comes to politically vulnerable groups, there is much less
variation among different forms of genetic selection. The case for
recognizing a constitutional right is weak across the board. To be sure, it
is possible to construct an argument that regulation of medical selection
would burden women who elect to reproduce later in life to avoid
interrupting their careers. Women who become pregnant over the age of
thirty-five face a steeply elevated risk of bearing children with Down
119
Syndrome and other chromosomal abnormalities. Preimplantation
aneuploidy screening can detect these conditions, allowing for the
120
implantation of an unaffected embryo. Banning such screening (or
limiting in vitro fertilization in ways that would make it practically
impossible) might therefore force some women into a harsh, statecreated dilemma, pitting career advancement against healthy offspring.
More generally, women as a group shoulder a grossly disproportionate
share of child-care responsibilities, an imbalance that seems likely to

115. As the Court’s abortion decisions suggest, other institutional factors can and sometimes do
overcome its general hesitancy to confront complex empirical questions. See supra note 98.
116. The one exception is reproductive cloning, which is banned in thirteen states. See Human
Cloning Laws, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/Health/
HumanCloningLaws/tabid/14284/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
117. This explains why state polling, where it is invoked to invalidate legislation, is almost always
wielded against fairly long-standing practices that have over time come to seem outmoded, unjust, or
even barbaric. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2002), and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), are
good examples.
118. See supra note 94.
119. See Devereux N. Saller, Jr. & Jacob A. Canick, Current Methods of Prenatal Screening for
Down Syndrome and Other Fetal Abnormalities, 51 Clinical Obstetrics & Gynecology 24, 25 (2008).
120. Preimplantation aneuploidy screening is simply a form of preimplantation genetic diagnosis
that screens for chromosomal abnormality, or aneuploidy, rather than specific genetic traits.
See P. Donoso et al., Current Value of Preimplantation Genetic Aneuploidy Screening in IVF, 13 Human
Reproduction Update 15, 15 (2007).
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grow even larger in families with severely disabled children. To the
extent that genetic selection affords women an opportunity to avoid
these differential responsibilities, banning it might be thought to
reinforce (and to be reinforced by) traditional gender stereotypes of
121
women as caregivers.
In the scheme of things, however, these arguments are comparatively
weak. Certainly, the regulation or even outright prohibition of genetic
selection would not impose anything like the disproportionate burden on
women that abortion bans did or that the criminalization of same-sex
sodomy did on gays and lesbians. Nor are women the sole group that
regulation of genetic selection would burden. Prospective fathers would
be burdened, too, as would the burgeoning reproductive health
122
industry. Moreover, some of the most passionate arguments for
regulating genetic selection have come from disabled persons and their
advocates, a group with its own compelling claims to political
123
vulnerability and underrepresentation. Add to all of this the fact that
most potential beneficiaries of genetic selection are comparatively welleducated and economically well-off, and the case for recognizing a
constitutional right on the political process grounds implicit in the
124
Court’s past decisions seems decidedly unimpressive.
Finally, recognizing a constitutional right to select the genes of one’s
offspring would require the Court to grapple with scientific and
sociological questions of substantial complexity. The technology involved
is both complicated and rapidly evolving. For courts to reliably assess the
individual interests at stake, they would need to understand the benefits

121. See, e.g., Dorothy C. Wertz & John C. Fletcher, A Critique of Some Feminist Challenges to
Prenatal Diagnosis, 2 J. Women’s Health 173 (1993) (making a similar argument in the context of
prenatal testing). But see Marsha Saxton, Why Members of the Disability Community Oppose Prenatal
Diagnosis and Selective Abortion, in Prenatal Testing and Disability Rights 147, 156–57 (Erik
Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000) (“Selective abortion will not challenge the sexism of the family
structure where women provide most of the care for children in general, for elderly parents, and for
those disabled in accidents or from nongenetic diseases.”).
122. The market for assisted reproductive technologies has been estimated at three billion dollars
and growing. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Price and Pretense in the Baby Market, in Baby Markets:
Money and the New Politics of Creating Families 41, 42 (Michele Bratcher Goodwin ed., 2010).
123. See sources cited supra note 9. There is also a woman-protective argument for regulation,
which holds that technology extending women’s child-bearing years harmfully reinforces their
traditional role as mothers and caretakers. On this view, the government demonstrates complicity in
gender bias not by regulating genetic selection but by permitting it. See sources cited supra note 10.
124. A possible exception is the right of disabled persons to engage in so-called intentional
diminishment in order to have children who share their condition. Deafness and dwarfism are the two
most commonly discussed examples. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, the NonIdentity Problem, and Legal Liability, 60 Hastings L.J. 347, 349 (2008). This is one form of genetic
selection that it is easy to imagine the political process regulating to the detriment of a politically
vulnerable group, arguably out of insufficient sensitivity to the distinctive culture and sense of identity
associated with disabilities like deafness. As explored in the next Part, however, courts seem unlikely
to be more sympathetic than the political process on this issue.
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and limitations of the particular technique in question, which in turn
would require a sound basic understanding of genomics. Courts would
also need to be sensitive to the potential for these benefits and
limitations to evolve over time and to keep up with those changes. On
the state interest side of the balance, courts would need a similar
willingness to study the actual mechanics of genetic-selection techniques,
which are crucial to understanding the arguments for regulation. What is
even more daunting, they would also need to assess the broad
sociological impacts of these techniques on the treatment of disabled
persons, the relationship between parents and children, socioeconomic
stratification, and the psychological and social development of children
conceived through genetic selection of various types. Standing alone,
these difficult empirical issues may or may not be sufficient to doom a
constitutional right to engage in genetic selection. But in conjunction
with the other factors already canvassed, they would appear to tip the
scales in that direction.

IV. A More Systematic Approach
The Court’s institutional analysis represents a large improvement
over the prevailing scholarly silence. This should not be terribly
surprising. Judges, unlike legal scholars, do not have the luxury of
viewing constitutional questions as abstract philosophical problems,
divorced from any real-world institutional context. Nevertheless, the
Court’s approach suffers from many significant shortcomings. The most
important of these is its fundamentally unsystematic character. The
Justices are clearly conscious of the importance of institutional choice
but do not attend to it consistently or take its empirical dimensions
seriously. With deep roots in the legal-process school, the qualitative
comparisons they rely on are prone to idealization and abstraction of
complicated real-world institutions; susceptible to fallacies of
125
composition; and, even at their best, frequently culminate in parades of
incommensurable institutional shortcomings (or, more rarely, virtues)
that frustrate comparative evaluation as much as they facilitate it. Too
often the Court does not bother to compare competing institutional
decisionmakers at all, instead treating the malfunction of one institution
as sufficient reason to allocate responsibility to another, whose failings
126
may be even greater.

125. Specifically, the Court is prone to fallaciously attributing the characteristics and motives of
individual officials to institutions as a whole, as in the assumption that the judiciary will make rational,
principled, or ideological decisions if individual judges are rational, principled, or ideological. Cf.
Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 52 (2009)
(discussing fallacies of composition and division in American public law).
126. See generally Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 13.
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Despite these limitations, the Court’s institutional analysis is an
important starting point for any reformist project, which must explain
how imperfect real-world courts can move from the status quo to a more
sophisticated approach. With that end in mind, Part IV.A lays out the
questions that an ideally rigorous and comprehensive institutional
analysis would have to address, contrasting them with the Court’s
basically ad hoc approach. These questions are familiar to constitutional
theorists, but as noted earlier, they have been largely overlooked in the
constitutional literature on genetic selection, which makes it useful to
review them here. Part IV.A does so. Part IV.B then turns to the most
powerful and systematic tool for comparative institutional analysis
developed by academics: namely, rational choice theory. Part IV.B
conducts a basic rational choice analysis of genetic-selection regulation,
drawing on Neil Komesar’s stripped down, “participation-centered”
approach to rational choice theory. This analysis conveys a rough sense
of the institutional and interest group landscapes on genetic-selection
issues and supports a few tentative conclusions for constitutional
decisionmaking in this area. Its primary purpose, however, is to illustrate
the broader strengths and challenges of using rational choice approaches
as a basis for normative constitutional analysis. Several of these
challenges, which have been largely overlooked in the existing literature,
are discussed at length in Part V.
A. Asking the Right Questions
First, and most basically, comparative institutional analysis involves
an assessment of the likely error rates and costs of the various
institutions that might be assigned decisionmaking authority over the
issue in question. This means asking of each institution: How frequently
127
is it likely to err? In what direction? And with what degree of severity?
When the Court asks these questions at all, it generally asks them at a
high level of abstraction and of only one institution. For example, as seen
in the previous Part, the Court is highly attuned to its own weaknesses
with respect to broad scientific and sociological questions, but for
purposes of institutional analysis it tends to treat all such questions as
fungible. More important, it tends to ignore the serious pathologies that
plague executive and legislative fact finding, especially on politically
128
fraught questions. When the interests of politically vulnerable groups
are at stake, the Court tends to do the reverse, scrupulously attending to
127. Of course, the ultimate question of interest is the weighted accuracy of the system as a whole.
In some circumstances, that accuracy may be enhanced by the introduction of an additional veto point,
such as judicial review, even if the second decisionmaker is more error prone than the first. See
Vermeule, supra note 125, at 52.
128. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1169, 1174–75 (2007)
(“Legislators can do serious investigations, but they rarely do.”).
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political malfunctions but ignoring the limited capacity of courts to
address them without creating even greater problems. A sophisticated
approach to institutional analysis would attend far more closely and
consistently to the actual functioning of the relevant institutions in
specific policy contexts and would be far more rigorously comparative in
129
its assessment of error costs.
Of course, the very notion of error rates and costs is meaningful
only in connection with a normative theory attaching weights and values
to particular errors. A libertarian theory, for example, would probably
assign greater—perhaps much greater—significance to erroneous
deprivations of individual liberty interests than to erroneous invalidations
of justified government regulation. The reverse might well be true of a
communitarian theory; at the very least, the differential would be
smaller. Although it is possible to imagine scenarios in which the two
approaches would nevertheless converge on the same constitutional
130
rule, no institutional analysis can be value neutral. Conversely, as Part
II demonstrated, no interesting or controversial constitutional rule can
be logically deduced from purely normative premises. Both normative
and comparative institutional analysis are always required.
Another important point is that comparative institutional assessment
of error costs (against the background of a particular normative theory)
131
is likely to involve a large measure of uncertainty. Once a normative
scale is selected, the important questions for making such an assessment
are empirical. But they will for the most part be both unanswered by the
existing empirical literature and, in a great many cases, will be
unanswerable, at least by quantitative methods. This fact goes a long way
toward explaining—and partially excusing—the Court’s empirical laxity
on institutional matters. Nevertheless, such indifference is regrettable. It
fosters complacency, creates a false sense of confidence, and obscures
the truly important questions. If courts and constitutional theorists
attended to those questions with greater care and rigor, it would often be
possible to improve the quality of our guesswork in the face of
uncertainty; to identify helpful theoretical models from positive political
theory, economics, or decision theory; and in some cases, to frame
132
questions for future quantitative or qualitative study.
An approach that did only this much would be a significant
improvement over the status quo, both academic and judicial. A
comprehensive analysis, however, would also have to consider the
decision costs, including opportunity costs, of adopting any particular
129. See generally Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 13.
130. For an in-depth discussion of when and why this might be the case, see infra Part V.B.
131. See Vermeule, supra note 13, at 3 (emphasizing empirical uncertainty).
132. Cf. id. (proposing a decision-theoretic response to the empirical uncertainties surrounding
institutional premises of statutory interpretation).
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constitutional rule. For example, even if courts perform marginally better
than alternative decisionmakers on genetic-selection issues, a judicially
enforceable constitutional right might nevertheless be ill-advised if it
traded off with close judicial supervision of some other regulatory field,
133
where the marginal advantage of courts was even greater. Of course, a
rule prohibiting most or all regulation of genetic-selection techniques
could be expected to reduce legislative decision costs, wholly or partially
compensating for the decision costs it would impose on courts.
Decision costs may also affect the relative attractiveness of different
methods of judicial supervision. All else being equal, clear and hardedged rules will fare better on this score because they can be more
expeditiously applied to individual cases and they minimize the need for
litigation by providing clear guidance to the relevant parties. For
example, both a strong libertarian right and a rule of no judicially
enforceable right at all would be likely to generate fewer decision costs
(judicial, legislative, and private) than a right of relational autonomy that
requires courts to balance individual and community interests case by
case (and legislatures and private parties to anticipate and work around
the balance struck by courts). Even if a more nuanced rule produced
fewer or less serious errors relative to communitarian goals, the greater
decision costs it would entail might tip the balance in favor of one bright134
line rule or the other.
Finally, any rigorous institutional analysis must consider the
dynamic effects on other institutions of adopting any particular judicial
approach. For example, might a rule of blanket judicial deference help to
foster a sense of legislative responsibility on questions of individual
liberty, with beneficial effects not only for reproductive freedom but for
135
political engagement with individual rights across the board?
Alternatively, might such a rule encourage even greater legislative
indifference to individual rights by eliminating even the prospect of
136
judicial oversight for the severest abuses? Still another possibility is

133. The extent, and even the existence, of such tradeoffs depends on the overall capacity of the
judiciary. For a variety of structural reasons, chiefly stemming from the hierarchical appellate
structure of the adjudicative process, that capacity is likely to be starkly limited as compared to other
decisionmaking institutions. See Komesar, Law’s Limits, supra note 99, at 40–41. At any given time, of
course, there may be a certain amount of slack in the system; the present caseload of the Supreme
Court suggests as much. See David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Declining Plenary Docket: A
Membership-Based Explanation, 27 Const. Comment. 151, 152 (2010) (describing the recent decline in
the Court’s plenary docket as “extraordinary”). But the question remains: of the innumerable social
problems toward which that unused capacity might be directed, on which could courts make the most
meaningful positive impact?
134. Which one would depend on the error rates and costs to be expected from an unrestrained
marketplace and legislature, respectively.
135. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social
Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law 81 (2008).
136. There are two additional possibilities. First, legislators may be so habituated to activist
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that one rule or the other might upset a larger system-level allocation of
authority between courts and legislatures that has the effect of reducing
aggregate error costs. Of course, this discussion just scratches the surface.
And of course, like error-cost assessment, analysis of decision costs and
dynamic institutional effects will often involve a large measure of
uncertainty. But grappling with these questions is an essential part of any
comprehensive constitutional analysis.
B. A Rational Choice Analysis
We have already seen the limits of the Court’s attempts to do so.
Fortunately, its ad hoc qualitative approach is not the only one available.
As is well known, economists, political scientists, and game theorists
have developed more formal methods for modeling the performance of
decisionmaking institutions, variously traveling under the banners of
rational choice theory, the economic theory of politics, public choice
137
theory, and positive political theory. These approaches, too, have their
limits as a basis for normative constitutional analysis, as we shall see. But
the systematic framework they provide for predicting comparative
institutional performance is, at a minimum, a valuable complement to
more ad hoc qualitative approaches.
This Subpart makes a rough first attempt at applying one such
138
framework to the regulation of genetic selection. Building on the basic
rational choice model, Komesar’s “participation-centered approach”
traces variations in institutional outputs to variations in the costs and
benefits of efficacious participation—most centrally, the costs of
information and organization and the per capita distribution of benefits—
139
among various stakeholders. It is these factors, Komesar suggests, that
judicial review that only a very significant, across-the-board shift toward judicial deference could
shock them into any greater sense of constitutional responsibility. If this were true, the marginal
benefit of a deferential approach on genetic-selection issues would be zero, while such an approach
would come at the cost of upholding the work product of a constitutionally oblivious legislature.
Second, even if local judicial deference on genetic-selection issues produced a meaningful marginal
increase in legislative constitutional responsibility (local or global), that increase might come only
after a significant time lag, as legislators habituated to activist judicial review gradually adjusted to the
new reality. If this were the case, the short-term costs of upholding constitutionally irresponsible
legislation during the transition period might well outweigh the long-term benefits of increased
legislative responsibility. See Vermeule, supra note 125, at 52.
137. See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins & Michael F. Thies, Rationality and the Foundations of
Positive Political Theory, 19 Leviathan 7 (1996).
138. In the nature of rough first cuts, the discussion that follows finesses (or outright suppresses)
many complexities and relies on many tentative empirical assumptions. The goal is not to offer firm
predictions about the functioning of the institutions examined. It is rather to venture reasonable
guesses, while in the process demonstrating the analytic power and limitations of the rational choice
approach as a basis for normative constitutional analysis.
139. See generally Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 13. I have selected Komesar’s
approach because it is relatively accessible and jargon-free and because Komesar has gone further
than any other theorist in applying the basic rational choice model to problems of comparative
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explain when and whether particular groups of stakeholders are able to
overcome collective action problems to effectively influence
decisionmaking institutions. To simplify greatly, small groups with high
per capita stakes are likely to have stronger incentives to learn their own
interests and lower costs of organizing to pursue those interests than
large groups with low per capita stakes, even if the total stakes of the
140
latter group are larger. On the other hand, in certain recurrent
circumstances that reduce their informational and organizational costs of
participation, larger groups, with more diffuse interests, can be
powerfully influential simply by virtue of their size.
For any given issue, these basic “dynamics of participation” will
generally remain relatively constant across institutions. That is to say, if
one institution is skewed toward a particular group of stakeholders, other
institutions are likely to be similarly skewed, though the degree of skew
may be different. The crucial issue for comparative institutional analysts,
therefore, is how different levels and types of participation are rewarded
141
by different decisionmaking institutions.
With this brief summary in mind, we can proceed to apply the
participation-centered approach to the regulation of genetic selection. It
will be useful to organize our inquiry into three steps. The first is to
identify the relevant stakeholders and their likely regulatory preferences.
The second is to assess (in this case, roughly estimate) the sizes of each of
these groups, the per capita distribution of stakes among their members,
and other factors affecting their organization costs. The third is to assess
the variation in these costs and benefits of participation among the

institutional analysis.
140. This proposition has become something close to a truism in legal scholarship, but in fact, it is
true only as a rough empirical generalization, as a moment’s reflection on successful mass movements
(not to mention majoritarian oppression) should suffice to demonstrate. The basis for this
generalization is not the logical, prisoners’ dilemma structure of collective action, which in one-shot
situations should prevent cooperation by small groups as well as large, and in iterative games should in
theory permit cooperation by large groups as well as small. Rather, it is the practical costs—mostly
information costs—of communicating, coordinating on a joint course of action, and making credible
commitments to cooperate (commitments that depend on the ability of the group to monitor
individual actors), which are often, though not always, prohibitive for large groups. See generally
Steven P. Croley, Regulation and Public Interests: The Possibility of Good Regulatory
Government (2008); Russell Hardin, Collective Action (1982).
141. Unlike many public choice theorists, Komesar does not assume that either officials or citizens
are “narrowly rational” (that is, motivated purely by material self-interest). Rather, he assumes that
individuals act instrumentally from an indeterminate mix of selfish, ideological, and altruistic motives.
The content of this mix in any given context obviously has an effect on institutional outputs, but that
effect is always mediated by the same dynamics of participation: individuals participate when the
benefits to them (including altruistic and ideological benefits) exceed the costs (most significantly, the
costs of effectively organizing group action). Officials, for their part, may act for partially or wholly
altruistic reasons, but they will remain in office (and indeed obtain office in the first place) only if
those reasons are sufficiently pleasing to the mobilized interest groups that fund campaigns and turn
out voters. See Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 13, at 65.
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different potential decisionmaking institutions. For present purposes, it
will be sufficient to consider the market, the political process, and the
courts, though along the way I will have a few observations to make
about subsidiary institutions within these broadly drawn categories.
One last prefatory note is in order. Despite my best efforts, I expect
the discussion that follows to strike some readers as off-puttingly
technical and others as distractingly informal. This is a regrettable,
though I think unavoidable, byproduct of writing for an audience
spanning pure constitutional lawyers, lawyer-reproductive health experts,
lawyer-social theorists, and lawyer-social scientists. An important theme
of this Subpart, and especially Part V, is the need for greater dialogue
among these groups. If I manage to annoy each of them enough to keep
the others reading, without driving any away, I will count my efforts a
success.
1. Step One: Stakeholders
The list of important stakeholders with the potential to influence
regulation of genetic-selection decisions is surprisingly long. At a
minimum, it would have to include the following:
• Parents who would like to select the genes of their offspring and
142
who will oppose regulation for self-interested reasons;
• Fertility specialists and genetic-testing service providers, who will
likely oppose regulation out of professional self-interest and
143
perhaps ideological commitment;
• Libertarian (as opposed to gender-egalitarian) factions of the prochoice movement, which will oppose regulation on personal
autonomy grounds and perhaps as a prophylactic against back144
door incursion on abortion rights;
• Religious conservatives (including the pro-life movement) who
will oppose genetic selection on moral grounds and perhaps as a
145
backdoor route to restricting abortion rights;

142. At least one organization already exists to represent the interests of this group. See Resolve,
Nat’l Infertility Ass’n, www.resolve.org (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
143. This group is represented by two professional organizations: the Society for Assisted
Reproductive Technology and the American Society for Reproductive Medicine. See Vision of ASRM,
Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Medicine, http://www.asrm.org/detail.aspx?id=35 (last visited Oct. 31, 2011);
Mission Statement, Soc’y for Assisted Reprod. Tech., http://www.sart.org/detail.aspx?id=4283 (last
visited Oct. 31, 2011).
144. On the divide between libertarian and egalitarian factions, see, for example, Carol Mason,
Who’s Afraid of Virginia Dare? Confronting Anti-Abortion Terrorism After 9/11, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L.
796, 801–02 (2004); Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1559, 1574–76, 1588, 1591 (1991).
145. One prominent example, among hundreds, is Operation Rescue. See Who We Are, Operation
Rescue, http://www.operationrescue.org/about-us/who-we-are/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
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• Disability-rights groups, concerned that selection against children
with disabilities will reduce respect for existing persons with
146
disabilities;
• Some feminist groups, concerned that women will be pressured by
their male partners and doctors into undergoing physically and
emotionally burdensome medical procedures against their own
147
best interests; and
• Communitarian groups, concerned about the potential of new
genetic technologies to exacerbate social inequalities and to
148
commodify the reproductive process.
2. Step Two: Costs and Benefits of Participation
Of these groups, prospective parents who wish to select the genes of
their offspring likely have the highest per capita stake. At a minimum,
each member of this group is willing to contemplate spending tens of
thousands of dollars on genetic selection and the attendant medical
149
procedures. For many, the interests at stake would be so significant as
to defy quantification in monetary terms. Members of this group are also
150
151
likely to be relatively well-off financially and relatively few in number
and thus likely to have the easiest time mobilizing to influence any

146. See, e.g., Stainton, supra note 9; David Ruebain, What Is Prejudice as It Relates to Disability
Anti-Discrimination Law?, Disability Rts. Educ. & Def. Fund, http://www.dredf.org/international/
paper_ruebain.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2011) (“The inescapable consequence of [genetic selection] is
that disabled people, as a distinct group, are specifically targeted before they can even be born.”). It is
important to emphasize that not all members of the disability-rights community share these concerns
or agree on the appropriate governmental response to them. See, e.g., Asch, supra note 9.
147. See, e.g., Feminist Int’l Network of Resistance to Reprod. & Genetic Engineering,
http://www.finrrage.org (last visited Oct. 31, 2011). As with the disability-rights community, it is
important to emphasize that not all feminists or feminist groups share these concerns. See supra note
145.
148. See, e.g., CGS: About Us, Ctr. for Genetics & Soc’y, http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/
article.php?list=type&type=10 (last visited Oct. 31, 2011); History, Council for Responsible
Genetics, http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/Help/History.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
149. See Lynn B. Davis et al., A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for
Carrier Couples of Cystic Fibrosis, 93 Fertility & Sterility 1793, 1793 (2010) (“In vitro fertilization
costs $10,000 or more, and intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), embryo biopsy, and PGD add
costs of approximately $1,500–$2,500 each. . . . [M]ore than one cycle is usually necessary to achieve a
live birth.”).
150. Of course, infertility, susceptibility to serious genetic disease, and the desire for genetically
exceptional children are hardly the exclusive province of the wealthy. But genetic-selection techniques
are expensive and seldom covered by insurance. Access to them therefore remains—and for the
foreseeable future seems likely to remain—available only to the financially privileged few. See, e.g.,
King, supra note 2, at 296–97, 313.
151. To date, preimplantation genetic screening has been used in fewer than 10,000 in vitro
fertilization cycles annually. See id. at 291 n.28. That number is likely to climb as genetic-testing
technologies and knowledge of the human genome improve, but in raw numbers, this group will
remain tiny relative to ideological opponents of genetic selection. Moreover, even as it grows, the per
capita stakes of its members will remain much higher than those of genetic-selection opponents.
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institution that exercises decisionmaking authority with respect to
genetic selection. Fertility specialists, genetic-testing professionals, and
other service providers will also have a relatively high per capita stake
and similar advantages of coordination (perhaps even greater, owing to
their stable professional interest in the issue and preexisting professional
152
organizations ). These groups will likely enjoy the support of a diffuse
but potentially sizeable fraction of the pro-choice movement, which
might partly compensate for its relatively low per capita stakes with a
153
sizable existing organizational structure.
Opponents of genetic selection seem likely to have a substantially
154
lower per capita stake than parents and medical professionals. Few of
them are likely to benefit from regulation in a direct personal sense,
material or otherwise. For those who might benefit directly (most
plausibly, the disabled), any benefits are likely to be small, incremental,
and causally attenuated. Most opponents, however, will be motivated by
ideology or, more broadly, by moral concerns. Such concerns are nothing
to sneeze at; they can be powerful motivators. Some especially
passionate members of this group might even have higher stakes than
individual parents or medical professionals. Nevertheless, the per capita
stakes of the latter groups seem almost certain to be higher than those of
genetic-selection opponents as a whole.
On the other hand, opponents of genetic selection seem likely to be
more numerous than proponents, including as they do religious
conservatives, the disability-rights community, leftist communitarians,
155
and some feminists.
This is significant because, as Komesar
demonstrates, numbers can and frequently do trump intensity when the
per capita stakes of the larger group are high enough relative to the costs
of participation, even if they are lower than the per capita stakes of a
156
smaller opposing group. The reason for this is simple: Once these

152. Such organizations may create what public choice theorists call “selective effects”—in other
words, private benefits that make membership worthwhile to individual members quite apart from the
collective benefits conferred by efficacious group action. Examples in the medical context would
include intragroup referrals, advertising, and professional development. See Mancur Olson, The
Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 137–38 (2nd prtg. 1971).
153. This sort of organizational “piggybacking” can substantially reduce the costs of participation.
See, e.g., Hardin, supra note 140, at 43.
154. Some especially passionate members of this group might have higher stakes than individual
parents or medical professionals, but the per capita stakes of those groups are likely to be higher.
155. For present purposes, this last group should be understood to include ordinary citizens for
whom the notions of cloning and genetic enhancement are repellent for nonreligious reasons,
potentially quite a substantial number.
156. See Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 13, at 224–25. The numbers advantage of
genetic-selection opponents is likely to be enhanced in practical terms by the fact that many persons
who may wish to use genetic-selection techniques in the future will be unaware of this fact until the
need arises. On the other hand, many individuals who will never use such techniques may place
value—and potentially quite significant value—on preserving their option to do so.
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groups cross the threshold intensity required to justify the costs of
organization, their greater size gives them substantial power in most
157
relevant decisionmaking institutions. Such may well be true in the
context of genetic selection, where a substantial subset of genetic158
selection opponents is very strongly motivated
and the ready
availability of highly salient religious and cultural tropes may reduce the
costs of mobilizing broad support (chiefly, the costs of informing and
motivating other low-intensity members—or potential members—of a
159
coalition).
Moreover, proregulation interests can likely draw on
substantial preexisting organizational infrastructure in the form of prolife groups and even churches themselves, further reducing their costs of
participation.
On the other hand, many salient and culturally powerful tropes are
also available to genetic-selection proponents—among them, the privacy
160
and personal liberty discourses of the pro-choice movement.
Furthermore, although a small minority in numerical terms, prospective
parents wishing to engage in genetic selection are neither discrete nor
161
insular. Many voters with no direct stake in the issue will have friends
or family members in this group. Even those who do not may be able to
imagine themselves, or those they care about, in a similar position. This
would presumably complicate the task of mobilizing broad support for
162
regulation.

157. Think of the aggregate power of racist white consumers to induce business owners in the Jim
Crow South to turn away black customers (or employees) whom it would otherwise have been in their
economic self-interest to serve (or hire). The same goes for the power of racist whites to maintain
segregated schools and other forms of public racial subjugation over the opposition of blacks with
much higher per capita stakes.
158. See, e.g., Kass, supra note 7, at 687.
159. Think only of the terms “playing god,” “designer babies,” and “neoeugenics,” all of which
provide cheap and potentially effective tools for raising awareness and opposition to genetic selection
among low-information voters, consumers, etc.
160. The fear that religious conservatives might use genetic-selection regulation as a stalking horse
for restricting abortion rights (perhaps through increased legal protection for embryos) seems likely to
increase the political potency of such a linkage. Cf. Tara Kole & Laura Kadetsky, Recent
Developments: The Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 39 Harv. J. on Legis. 215, 216 (2002) (expressing
similar concerns about the Unborn Victims of Violence Act as an incremental assault on abortion
rights).
161. See Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 13, at 225 (“Insularity and discreteness
make the minority a safe target and often increase the possibility of majority activity by making the
presence of simple symbols more likely.”); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53
n.4 (1938).
162. An important complication, glossed over here, is that neither proponents nor opponents of
genetic selection are likely to be monolithically opposed to (or in favor of) all regulations. Their
commonalities of interest might enable them to form political alliances, as I have been assuming, but
their differences might also enable opposing forces to employ variations on the strategy of divide and
conquer. Genetic-selection opponents, for example, might peel off or weaken the opposition of
proponents by promising (explicitly or implicitly) to restrict regulation to genetic-enhancement uses.
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3. Step Three: Comparing Institutions
The picture just painted is murky, to say the least. Standing alone,
the high per capita stakes of parents and fertility professionals would
seem likely to secure legislative forbearance at least as to those geneticselection decisions most people would recognize as central to procreative
163
liberty and perhaps more. The concentrated interest of parents and
doctors would also make it unlikely that diffuse costs to the dignity of
disabled persons or traditional religious views about the propriety of
choosing the traits of future children would be reflected in the outcomes
of an unregulated market. The prospect of such dispersed groups
organizing to pay parents and doctors to forsake genetic selection
164
borders on fanciful. Nevertheless, the greater numbers of geneticselection opponents provide reason for pause, especially in combination
with the intensity of religious feeling; the extensive pro-life
organizational apparatus; and the ready availability of simple and highly
salient religious and cultural symbols for portraying genetic selection in a
negative light. This could well be enough to put genetic selection on the
regulatory agenda, at least in particular states where these interests are
165
likely to be concentrated and especially for more controversial uses like
166
167
genetic enhancement, intentional diminishment, and sex selection.

163. The exact mechanisms by which concentrated interest groups exert political influence are
somewhat vaguely specified, both by Komesar and public choice theorists, especially in the context of
federal administrative agencies. See generally Croley, supra note 140 (noting the conceptual and
empirical shortcomings in the public choice claim that a special-interest beholden Congress dominates
such agencies). Nevertheless, the list plausibly includes campaign donations for or against incumbent
office holders; voter mobilization efforts; the supply of slanted information to busy, data-starved
legislators; and more remotely, bribes (or their functional equivalent) and the prospect of
postgovernment employment. Crucially, none of these but the last two depends on official venality for
its efficacy. All the others are consistent with an evolutionary view in which only those officials whose
view of the public interest conforms to (or comes to conform to) that of mobilized interest groups are
elected or appointed to public office. See Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 13, at 63–64.
164. But cf. History, Operation Rescue, http://www.operationrescue.org/about-us/history/ (last
visited Oct. 31, 2011). This pro-life organization claims to have purchased and closed a women’s health
clinic where abortions were provided.
165. The strength of religious conservatives in the Deep South makes it seem like particularly
fertile ground. Indeed, the Georgia State Senate recently considered legislation that, by requiring the
implantation of all embryos created in a given in vitro fertilization cycle, would effectively have
banned preimplantation genetic screening (which by definition involves discarding embryos). Though
the bill appears to have died in committee, it produced an intense legislative fight, which shaped up
much as the analysis of this Article would have predicted, with religious conservatives (and pro-life
groups in particular) mobilizing in support of the bill and fertility specialist and patient advocacy
groups (successfully) mobilizing against it. See William Saletan, The IVF Battlefield, Slate (Mar. 8,
2009, 11:22 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/blogs/humannature/archive/2009/03/08/the-ivf-battlefield.aspx.
166. Intentional diminishment, recall, refers to the deliberate selection of genetic traits that society
at large would consider disabilities. See supra note 124.
167. Roughly similar coalitions have succeeded in obtaining very strong regulations in Germany
and Italy and somewhat weaker regulations in the United Kingdom, though the political and cultural
contexts are obviously quite different from the United States. See John A. Robertson, Reproductive
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Depending on the intensity and distribution of public discomfort,
genetic-selection opponents may even be able to mobilize sufficiently
broad support to achieve total prohibition, though this seems distinctly
unlikely.
Even if genetic-selection decisions are left to an officially unregulated
market, these factors might allow genetic-selection opponents to bring
enough pressure to bear on service providers to induce professional selfregulation or clinic closings that would accomplish many, though
probably not all, of their goals. Such pressure might take the form of a
public shaming campaign; social ostracism of individual service
providers; boycotts of hospitals, clinics, and insurance companies offering
genetic-selection services; or threats of political mobilization, to name
168
just a few possibilities. At first blush, these forms of mass action would
seem unusually difficult to organize in the health care context, where the
choices of most consumers are highly constrained by insurance networks
and where so many other important interests are at stake in choosing
providers. But the extremely limited availability of abortion services in
many states where pro-life sentiment runs high is evidence that active
169
majorities can exert a powerful influence even in this atypical market.
The political process and the market may thus be expected to run
reasonably closely together. The same factors that predict success in one
arena predict success in the other. Nevertheless, it seems safe to say that
genetic-selection opponents would prefer to compete in the political
arena (where the tools at their disposal are stronger) and geneticselection proponents in the market (where the tools of their opponents
170
are weaker). Whether and to what extent either group gets its way will
depend on the constitutional rule adopted by courts. In this sense, the

Technology in Germany and the United States: An Essay in Comparative Law and Bioethics, 43 Colum.
J. Transnat’l L. 188, 205 (2004) [hereinafter Robertson, Reproductive Technology].
168. That we have not yet seen these forms of pressure (or, for that matter, meaningful regulation)
is some evidence that the numbers advantage of genetic-selection opponents is at present insufficient
to overcome the higher per capita stakes of proponents. Of course, this may well change as genetic
selection becomes more common (and thus more salient) and is used in new (and more controversial)
ways. Even then, the geographic distribution of strong opposition to genetic selection may limit the
scale on which these forms of market pressure can succeed. If that distribution is uneven, as it is for
abortion, the market for genetic selection may continue to flourish in some states even while vanishing
in others. To the extent that the agenda of opponents demands a uniform national rule, this would
increase the attractiveness of the political process for them and decrease its attractiveness for genetic
selection proponents.
169. See Jennifer Baumgardner, Abortion & Life 16 (2008). Social ostracism of abortion
providers (and seekers) is probably the most important mechanism for this influence.
170. Note that this runs contrary to the basic normative tenet of public choice theory: that the
political influence of concentrated interest groups justifies leaving most issues to the market. One of
Komesar’s most enduring insights is that concentrated interests will enjoy outsized influence in both
the political process and the market, and that indeed, that influence may be even greater in the
market. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?,
101 Yale L.J. 31, 43, 46 (1991) (making a similar point).
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decision whether to recognize a constitutional right to engage in any
particular form of genetic selection is an institutional choice about how
to divide decisionmaking authority between the market and the political
process. More precisely, it is a choice governing which institution will do
this dividing. This point is fundamental. A strong constitutional right
makes courts the primary decisionmaker about when, if ever, the
political process will be permitted to play a regulatory role. A rule of no
constitutional right, by contrast, leaves determinations about the scope of
171
that regulatory role to the political process itself.
Because there is essentially no chance that American courts will
172
affirmatively require regulation of genetic selection, only proponents
of genetic selection have something to gain through the recognition of a
judicially enforceable right. What precisely that is (and what opponents
of genetic selection have to lose) turns on the costs and benefits of
efficacious participation in the judicial process. Interest groups mobilize
to influence the judiciary in two ways—through adjudication and through
the appointments process—each of which carries different costs and
benefits. In the event that regulations are adopted and challenged in
court, the threshold costs of bringing a serious constitutional challenge to
those regulations is high in comparison to the costs of voting or writing
letters to one’s congressperson or submitting comments on an agency
rulemaking. But once that threshold is cleared, as it certainly would be in
the context of genetic selection, the marginal impact of additional
litigation expenditures almost certainly declines much more quickly than
173
the marginal impact of additional political efforts. There is a huge
difference between a one-million and a ten-million dollar political ad
campaign or campaign donation. There is a much smaller difference
between a one-million and a ten-million dollar litigation effort, especially
171. See Komesar, Law’s Limits, supra note 99, at 161 (“Strong rights in constitutional law—such
as old-fashioned (and always fatal) strict scrutiny under equal protection law or the absolutist position
on free speech—allocate significant responsibility away from political processes to informal
processes. . . . With weak rights, the sweeping allocation is to the political process rather than the
informal process (markets, communities, individuals).”).
172. This is a simple corollary of the strong—though conceptually suspect—American commitment
to a constitution of negative, rather than positive, liberties. Cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 204 (1988). In Germany, which has a strong constitutional tradition of
positive liberties, courts have affirmatively required regulation of in vitro fertilization (and by
extension, genetic selection) to protect the dignity of human embryos. See Robertson, Reproductive
Technology, supra note 167. But see Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 6, 2010
(holding that German law permits preimplantation testing to screen for serious genetic diseases). U.S.
courts could logically reach a similar result by reading the word “person” in the Equal Protection
Clause to include embryos, but for now at least, such a result is jurisprudentially unthinkable. Cf.
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Michael Stokes Paulsen (dissenting), in What ROE V. WADE Should Have
Said 196 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment obligates state
governments to accord fetuses equal protection of the laws).
173. See Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political Faith, 22 Law & Soc. Inquiry 959,
968 (1997) (making this point).
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given the willingness of many top-notch lawyers to donate (or discount)
their services for altruistic or ideological reasons. Consequently, to the
extent that effective advocacy influences outcomes, courts are likely to
be relatively friendly terrain for political losers seeking to overturn
burdensome regulations—in this case, parents, doctors, and other
174
genetic-selection proponents.
Of course, it is not only—or even primarily—effective advocacy that
influences judicial outcomes. The composition of the judiciary, and in
particular the Supreme Court, matters greatly. And that composition in
turn is a product of the politics of the appointment and confirmation
processes. However committed individual judges may be to politically
impartial decisionmaking and however much life tenure may free them
from ongoing dependency on the political branches, the legal
philosophies, life experiences, and psychological dispositions with which
they approach cases will be ones that the vector sum of political forces in
the presidency and the Senate found acceptable at the time of their
appointments. To this extent, the large proportion of judicial outcomes
in close constitutional cases that are a product of judicial ideology will
175
tend to favor the same interests favored by the political process.
This tendency, however, is subject to several important qualifications.
First, given the long tenure of most federal judges, and in particular
176
Supreme Court Justices, it is not uncommon for courts to face
controversial constitutional questions that were not even on the political
radar screen at the time some (or even a majority) of the sitting judges or
Justices were appointed. Second, the vector sum of political forces can
fluctuate substantially during the tenure of a given judge or Justice (or
group of judges or Justices). Third, at least historically, both judicial
appointments and confirmations have frequently been made on the basis
of rather limited information about individual nominees’ ideological
177
views. Moreover, even where a nominee’s views are a matter of
extensive public record (or reliable private assurance), those views can
and occasionally do evolve substantially over the fifteen, twenty, or even

174. This is not to suggest that genetic-selection proponents are likely to lose in the political
process. As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the odds are probably slightly against it, though
this is very difficult to predict. The point is merely that, if they were to lose in the political process,
genetic-selection proponents would have a modest hope of reversing that loss in the courts. In the
opposite situation, opponents of genetic selection would have no such hope.
175. Cf. Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (1956); Friedman, supra note 67.
176. See, e.g., Justin Crowe & Christopher F. Karpowitz, Where Have You Gone, Sherman
Minton? The Decline of the Short-Term Supreme Court Justice 1 (Princeton Law & Pub. Affairs
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 06-014, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=948813 (finding
that the mean tenure of Supreme Court Justices has reached twenty-five years).
177. See Norman Dorsen, The Selection of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 4 Int’l J. Const. L. 652,
662–63 (2006) (noting the ideological unpredictability of many twentieth-century Supreme Court
appointments).
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thirty-year period she spends on the bench. Fourth, the political forces
that determine federal judicial appointments are national, whereas many
challenged regulations (and the vast majority of invalidated regulations)
are the product of state and local political processes, where the balance
of interests may be quite different. The combined effect of these
qualifications is to produce a greater divergence between the federal
courts and the political process than the political dynamics of participation
178
in judicial appointments and confirmation might otherwise suggest.
This divergence might be even larger but for the institutional dependence
of the courts on the other branches, in particular the executive branch, to
carry their decisions into effect.
4. Takeaways
What should constitutional analysts take away from all of this? First,
in the event that opponents of genetic selection succeed in procuring
regulations through the political process, a participation-centered
analysis offers proponents some relatively modest hope of obtaining a
more favorable outcome through the courts. At a minimum, the courts
give proponents, but not opponents, of genetic selection a second bite at
179
the apple, on what should be a more even playing field. If courts were
to adopt a strong constitutional right to engage in genetic selection, the
balance would tip even further in favor of regulation proponents, though
of course the stability of that balance would be subject to the ongoing
dynamics of participation.
Second, the capacity of the rational choice approach to generate
reliable conclusions depends heavily on the quality of a broad array of
empirical inputs. These range from the likely demand for different types
of genetic-selection services to the strength of the pro-life organizational
infrastructure to the nature and depth of the divide between personal
autonomy and egalitarian pro-choice activists. In the first-cut analysis
offered here, I have been content simply to make plausible assumptions

178. Occasionally that divergence can be quite extreme, as in decisions like Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251, 251 (1918) (invalidating a federal ban on interstate shipment of goods produced through
child labor), Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (holding that recitation of an official school
prayer violates the Establishment Clause), and Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010)
(striking down federal limits on corporate campaign expenditures). On the unpopularity of these
decisions, see Alison Gash & Angelo Gonzales, School Prayer, in Public Opinion and
Constitutional Controversy 62, 62 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds. 2008) (in regards to Engel); Michael
J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 Va. L. Rev. 747, 775 (1991) (in
regards to Hammer); Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court’s Decision on
Campaign Financing, Wash. Post, Feb. 17, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2011) (in regards to Citizens United).
179. Of course, the occasion for a constitutional challenge will arise only if the political process
turns out to favor pro-regulation forces at some point in time.
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on these issues. But a rigorous rational choice analysis is possible only
with reliable and relatively precise information about each of them.
This is the first of several reasons that greater dialogue is needed
between institutionalists and other scholars. Even if rational choice
theory were the alpha and the omega of institutional analysis, it could
generate actionable conclusions only with substantial assistance from
reproductive health experts. On the other hand, to provide such
assistance, scholars like Robertson and Suter will have to talk to rational
choice theorists and think in more institutionally sensitive terms. The
challenges of institutional choice discussed in the next Part only make
such dialogue more important.

V. The Challenges of Institutional Choice
Rational choice theories have, of course, been subject to intense and
180
sustained criticism. By relaxing the assumption of narrow rationality,
Komesar’s participation-centered approach sidesteps some of that
criticism but not all of it. For obvious reasons, however, I cannot wade
into this large and long-running debate here. Fortunately, neither the
soundness of the standard criticisms of rational choice nor their
applicability to the participation-centered approach affects the point I
want to make in this Part. Even if we take the participation-centered
approach on its own terms, any attempt to employ it as a basis for
institutional choice faces a number of formidable challenges. This Part
uses genetic selection as a case study to explore several of them.
My object in doing so is not to criticize the participation-centered
approach or Komesar’s many imaginative applications of it. To the
contrary, I believe it is the best and most systematic approach to
181
comparative institutional analysis available. But no approach to any
problem is without limits or difficulties. And, in the complex arena of
institutional analysis, no approach is without many serious ones.
Komesar is well aware of this fact and has frequently supplemented the
participation-centered approach with other modes of analysis to
illuminating effect. This Part attempts to push one step further and
provide a general account of which questions the participation-centered

180. See generally Croley, supra note 140; Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and
Public Choice: A Critical Introduction (1991); Donald P. Green & Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of
Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (1994).
181. I am hardly the only one to hold this view. See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, A Structural Theory of
WTO Dispute Settlement: Why Institutional Choice Lies at the Center of the GMO Case, 41 N.Y.U. J.
Int’l L. & Pol. 1, 1 (2008) (describing Komesar’s work on comparative institutional analysis as “pathbreaking”); see also Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of
Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 Harv. J. Law & Tech. 569, 575 (2001) (same); Wendy
Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95 Geo. L.J. 693, 697
(2007) (same).
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approach can and cannot answer, to what degree, and in which
circumstances.
Some of the challenges this Part explores highlight the importance
of greater dialogue between institutionalists and substantive policy
experts. Others highlight the potential benefits of supplementing the
participation-centered approach with complementary approaches to
institutional analysis. Still others highlight the impressive versatility of
the participation-centered approach. A cross-cutting theme is the
inherent complexity of institutional choice and the difficulties it creates
for any rigorous analytical approach. Whether or not we can improve on
the participation-centered approach in any given situation, a deeper
understanding of these difficulties should enable us to apply it more
intelligently. Given the starring role it justly continues to play in
comparative institutional analysis, that is no small thing.
A. The Normative Gap
The most obvious and important challenge facing the participationcentered approach is the imperfect match between the likely fortunes of
different interest groups (what the approach predicts) and most plausible
normative goals (what institutional choice seeks to maximize). This is a
general point, but it is well illustrated in the context of genetic selection.
Consider again the libertarian position introduced in Part II. Given their
commitment to a broad right of procreative liberty, libertarians are likely
to be generally sympathetic to interest groups opposed to regulation of
genetic selection. If the participation-centered approach revealed that
such groups would be seriously and systematically disadvantaged in the
political process while faring relatively well in the market, that would
provide a powerful reason for libertarians to embrace a strong judicially
182
enforceable constitutional right. But absent such a stark imbalance, not
just between interest groups but between institutions, the implications
are much less clear.
While libertarians generally favor a broad constitutional right, they
recognize that procreative liberty has limits. It extends only to those
genetic-selection decisions that implicate the interests that make
reproduction a valued activity (or perhaps only those that most people
183
are prepared to recognize as central to procreative liberty).
Libertarians also recognize that the right to procreative liberty may be
overridden when it conflicts with sufficiently important government
interests. Given these commitments, libertarians are compelled to ask:
Might courts applying these principles systematically overprotect

182. The effect of such a right, of course, would be to allocate decisions about the use of genetic
selection to the unregulated marketplace.
183. See supra note 36–37 and accompanying text.

COAN_20 (J. GRANTZ) (DO NOT DELETE)

December 2011]

12/5/2011 11:35 PM

A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO GENE SELECTION?

277

genetic-selection decisions that fall outside the legitimate scope of
reproductive liberty? Or might they systematically invalidate justified
regulations that legitimately implicate the right but are necessary to
protect a compelling state interest? If so, would these error costs be
greater or smaller than the benefits of a strong constitutional right (in
terms of regulations correctly invalidated or deterred from adoption in
the first place)?
The participation-centered approach certainly sheds some light on
these questions. For instance, it gives us reason to believe that courts are
most likely to err on the side of overprotection when they are staffed
with judges sympathetic to pro-genetic-selection interests. That in turn is
most likely when such interests are politically strong enough to secure
the appointment of jurisprudential allies to the courts. These are rough
generalizations, of course. But to the extent they hold, the participationcentered approach suggests that overprotection is most likely when
protection itself is least necessary. That might be a persuasive argument
184
against recognizing a constitutional right, even to libertarians, if we
could be confident that genetic-selection proponents would be politically
dominant.
Since we cannot be confident of this result, however, we are again
left to consider the indeterminate case in which interest groups whose
goals partially overlap with the libertarian vision are likely to be at least
partially successful in the political process and perhaps modestly more
successful in the courts. If these groups achieve enough success in the
political process—and success of the right kind—to secure the goals they
share in common with libertarians, courts can do little good by
recognizing a strong constitutional right. Indeed, such a right might well
do positive harm, invalidating only (or mostly) those regulations that
libertarians would regard as justified. If the reverse is true, however, and
the regulations that make it through the political process are mostly
unjustified, a constitutional right might be the only hope of preventing
what libertarians would regard as serious and disturbing invasions of
procreative liberty.
How should libertarians respond to these possibilities? The
participation-centered approach, unfortunately, provides little guidance.
The point goes well beyond the familiar Dworkinian critique of legalprocess theories: that any conception of political or process malfunction
185
must be defended on substantive grounds. Rather, even taking such
grounds as given, a participation-centered analysis can often provide
184. This would depend, in part, on the relative weight attached to Type I and Type II errors—in
this context, erroneous invalidations of regulations necessary to protect a compelling state interest and
erroneous validations of regulations that violate procreative liberty, properly understood.
185. See Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 469, 510 (1981) (advancing
this critique of John Hart Ely’s representation-reinforcement theory of judicial review).
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only crude information about which allocation of institutional authority
will most reliably give them practical effect. It may tell us which
allocation is best for genetic-selection proponents and other interest
groups, but not which is best for libertarians (or most other normative
views). I shall call this problem the normative gap. The existence of such
a gap is a serious challenge for institutional choice, so it is worth
considering what determines the existence and the extent of this gap in
any given case and how, if at all, the gap might be closed.
1. Measuring the Gap
The existence and extent of the normative gap are a function of
three factors. The first is the nature of the normative goal or goals in
question. All else being equal, the more closely a goal coincides with the
success of a particular interest group (or with the breadth of participation
by interest groups generally), the smaller the normative gap. The reason
should be obvious. These are the aspects of institutional performance the
participation-centered approach sets out to explain; unless it fails
completely in that task, it is natural that the approach would be most
186
helpful when these aspects are most relevant.
The second factor is the degree of divergence among institutions:
the greater the divergence, the smaller the gap. The reason here is a little
more complicated. Even where the normative goal in question does not
align perfectly with the agenda of any interest group, it will generally
187
correlate more strongly with some than others. Where these groups
would fare substantially better in one institution than in the plausible
alternatives, the mere correlation between their agendas and the relevant
goal may be sufficient to justify the allocation of authority to that
institution.
The third and final factor is the degree of precision with which the
participation-centered approach is able to predict the specific successes
and failures of each interest group: the greater the precision, the smaller
188
the gap. In the limiting case, if the approach were able to predict

186. This is not to say that the approach is capable of transcending conflict between normative
goals in these circumstances (though it may be in others). To the contrary, where such goals closely
align with the success of interest groups on different sides of a political struggle, success for one is
almost by definition defeat for the other. From within any given normative perspective, however, it is
in these circumstances that the participation-centered approach most clearly dictates a single
institutional choice—even if it dictates exactly the opposite choice for adherents of another normative
view.
187. The partial overlap between the goals of libertarians and genetic-selection proponents is an
example.
188. It is important to distinguish precision—which might also be called granularity—from
confidence. The participation-centered approach might predict with one hundred percent confidence
that genetic-selection proponents will succeed in blocking seventy percent of genetic-selection
regulation in the political process and a further twenty percent if courts recognized a strong
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outcomes in each institution on every issue and sub-issue across the
policy spectrum, the normative gap would be nonexistent. Institutional
choice would simply be a matter of applying the relevant goal or goals to
189
predicted outcomes and allocating institutional authority accordingly.
Unfortunately, the participation-centered approach will not be able
to achieve anything like this degree of precision in the usual case. Nor
will the divergence between institutions typically be sufficient to
eliminate the normative gap; as we have already seen, the same factors
that predict success in one institutional arena frequently predict success
in the others. There are, to be sure, some normative goals, in particular
allocative efficiency, that correlate highly with levels of participation, and
some, including certain conceptions of democracy, that are actually
defined by them. But unless one of these goals is in play, a nontrivial
normative gap is likely to persist, which is to say that a participationcentered analysis will be consistent with multiple competing institutional
choices.
2. Closing the Gap
How, if at all, this gap might be closed is a difficult question. The
basic challenge is to figure out which aspects of institutional
decisionmaking might tip outcomes in normatively consequential
directions when the participation-centered analysis runs out of steam.
One tempting response to this challenge would simply be to apply the
Court’s qualitative approach, albeit more systematically. Such an
approach is superficially attractive because it appears to focus directly on
the issue of interest: the capacities of different institutions to advance a
specific normative goal. It might, for example, ask which institution is
best suited to identify the interests that make reproduction a valued
activity or to make a sound empirical judgment about the likelihood that
different forms of genetic selection would negatively affect the disabled.
To answer these questions, however, requires a theory about the factors
driving institutional performance, which the Court’s qualitative approach
does not supply. To the extent that performance is a product of the
dynamics of participation that a participation-centered analysis was
simply not fine grained enough to pick out (hence the gap), we are right
back where we started.
Two other possible approaches may be more promising. The first
would focus on past institutional performance in contexts with comparable
constitutional right. But without knowing precisely which regulations would be blocked in each
institution, it is difficult to know whether such a right would make things better or worse. The
normative gap would be smaller if the approach could predict the fate of specific regulations with only
ninety percent confidence.
189. This elides the possibility of uncertainty about which regulations are in fact desirable. I take
up this important issue, which has both normative and empirical dimensions, in Part V.C.
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dynamics of participation. The idea here would be to identify situations
that are institutionally and substantively similar to the one under
consideration and, through the power of hindsight, to glean useful
insights about the capacities of different institutions to advance specific
normative goals. A second possible approach would focus on
determinants of institutional performance not captured (at least not
fully) in a participation-centered analysis—things like official competence,
institutional norms and culture, and available resources—with particular
190
reference to their implications for a given goal or goals. The idea here
would be that, if the participation-centered approach generates a
normative gap, the considerations necessary to close it must be ones
outside its ken.
Neither approach is without significant limitations. The first is
useful only to the extent it is possible to identify past situations with
genuinely similar dynamics of participation, which seems likely to be
quite difficult in most instances. Even when two situations appear similar
in all significant respects, the quality of institutional performance in
either might be traceable to differences of participation too subtle to
detect. If such differences are correlated to observable differences, the
approach may still be helpful, but it is difficult to know how often that
will be the case. The second approach, for its part, is useful only to the
extent that factors other than participation exert an independent
influence on institutional performance. That extent is almost certainly
not zero, and it may be larger at the margin, in cases where the
participation-centered approach has run out. But in many cases the
approach will run out not because the crucial institutional factors are
outside its ken but simply because it is impossible to predict the
dynamics of participation with the necessary precision.
Nevertheless, where a normative gap persists, these supplementary
approaches are all an institutional analyst has got. If they can close the
gap even a little, that is something. If not, application of the
participation-centered approach should still benefit from greater
sensitivity to the existence of the gap, to the factors that determine its
extent in any given case, and to the limits it implies in the capacity of the
approach to justify a single institutional choice among the plausible
alternatives. Although the emptiness of institutional analysis without
191
normative analysis is generally acknowledged, the intricacy of this

190. Komesar supplements the participation-centered approach in much this way, especially in his
discussions of the adjudicative process. See, e.g., Komesar, Law’s Limits, supra note 99, at 38–39
(comparing judicial and juror competence); id. at 39–40 (analyzing constraints on the growth
adjudicative process imposed by its hierarchical structure). A better understanding of the normative
gap and its causes should help to identify other opportunities for supplementation.
191. See Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 13, at 5; Vermeule, supra note 13, at 6–7.
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interplay between the two has been largely overlooked in the existing
literature.
B. Disentangling Normative and Institutional Considerations
The interplay is made even more intricate by the fact that many
normative goals are best understood as resting in part on unarticulated
institutional assumptions. This represents both a challenge and an
opportunity for the participation-centered approach. It is a challenge
because, like any approach to institutional analysis, the participationcentered approach can serve as a basis for normative analysis only if it is
clear which goals are relevant to assessing institutional performance. It is
an opportunity because disagreements that first appear to be normative
may on closer inspection turn out to be institutional and thus susceptible
to resolution, at least in part, through a participation-centered analysis.
Again, the libertarian and communitarian perspectives on genetic
selection are good examples. On the surface, both appear to be
concerned purely with normative goals. Libertarians are committed to a
broad ideal of procreative liberty that may be overridden only in
extremis, while communitarians favor a weaker principle that would give
way to a broader range of competing considerations. As a theoretical
matter, these commitments could be purely, irreducibly normative. But
in that case, the natural next step would be for each group to ask which
institutional arrangement would best serve its respective commitments.
That both groups jump past this step—proceeding confidently from
putatively normative premises to conclusions about how particular
institutions should act—suggests that more is going on beneath the
surface.
More specifically, it suggests that both groups are relying heavily on
unarticulated institutional assumptions. While libertarians probably do
place a higher ultimate value on procreative liberty than do
communitarians, they also seem intuitively to place greater faith in courts
and the market than in the political process to strike the right balance
192
between this liberty and other competing interests. Similarly, while
communitarians probably do place a higher ultimate value on avoiding
broad social harms, they also seem intuitively to place greater faith in the

192. That this must be so is underscored by the willingness of libertarians to permit interference
with most other forms of personal liberty whenever a minimally rational basis can be offered for doing
so. See, e.g., Robertson, Era of Genomics, supra note 38, at 472–73. As a first-best normative position,
this would be truly bizarre. To normatively justify interference with personal liberty—on any plausible
view—requires an adequate justification, not merely a conceivably rational one. But on institutional
grounds, it is perfectly defensible for courts to apply the rational-basis rule to less important liberties
or liberties the political process is better suited to protect. Indeed, given the judiciary’s sharply
constrained time and material resources, this is practically inevitable, though which liberty interests
fall into each of these categories is subject to debate.

COAN_20 (J. GRANTZ) (DO NOT DELETE)

282

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

12/5/2011 11:35 PM

[Vol. 63:233

political process than in courts or the market. Otherwise, neither group
could move so confidently from normative premises to conclusions about
how particular institutions should act.
If this is correct, the putatively normative goals espoused by the
libertarian and communitarian approaches rest on institutional as well as
normative foundations. Unlike their normative foundations, however,
these institutional foundations are largely unexamined and undefended,
even unconscious. As a consequence, any institutional analysis that
uncritically takes a libertarian or communitarian vision as its starting
point is akin to the proverbial house built on sand. However
unimpeachable the subsequent reasoning, its conclusions will be no
firmer than the institutional assumptions embedded in the normative
vision it began by taking as given.
To avoid falling into this trap, institutionalists need to figure out
which aspects of the libertarian and communitarian visions are normative
and which are institutional. There are two basic ways to approach this
inquiry. The first is through conventional normative analysis, which can
be helpful in this context whether or not normative disagreements are
193
generally susceptible to illumination by analysis. The basic idea is to
abstract the purely normative commitments of different groups from
their implicitly assumed institutional context through a series of
hypotheticals. For example, if libertarians are really, unequivocally
committed to the goal of procreative liberty in the absence of
extraordinary countervailing interests, they should be willing to defend it
as a desirable end even at the expense of interests they themselves would
recognize as very substantial. If, instead, they embrace this goal based on
an implicit assumption that the political process will place too little
weight on procreative liberty, they should, in the abstract, be willing to
acknowledge situations where substantial but non-extraordinary interests
might prevail.
A second possible approach would start with the institutional,
rather than the normative, side of the entanglement issue. The basic idea
here would be to use the response of libertarians and communitarians to
various distributions of institutional competence to flush the implicit
institutional assumptions of each group out into the open. This could be
done either through institutional hypotheticals or simply by gauging the
reactions of the two groups to the results of a participation-centered
analysis. Imagine, for example, that such an analysis strongly predicted
that the political process would regulate genetic selection only where
libertarians would recognize the societal interests at stake as genuinely

193. Compare Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes 75–104 (2006) (arguing in the affirmative),
with Richard A. Posner, 1997 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Problematics of Moral and Legal
Theory, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1637, 1668–75 (1998) (arguing in the negative).
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substantial. How might libertarians respond to this hypothetical? One
possibility is that they would abandon their support for judicial strict
scrutiny. If so, that would suggest that their putatively normative
commitment to a virtually absolute ideal of procreative liberty was
actually borne of an instinctive distrust for the political process.
All of this may sound straightforward, but the practical application
of both approaches would generate real challenges. Start with
conventional normative analysis. In theory, it should be able to probe the
normative commitments of different groups in an institutional vacuum:
Assume X quantum of procreative liberty can be had only at the expense
of Y quantum of societal interest Z. Which should we prefer? Nothing in
the question logically depends on comparative institutional competence.
In practice, however, any answer is likely to be infected to some degree
with unconscious assumptions about how the conflict between these
hypothetical interests would be resolved in the real world. If one assumes
societal interest Z would be protected through regulation while
procreative liberty would be protected by courts, then one’s intuitive
views about these institutions cannot help but shape one’s response to
194
the hypothetical.
The institutional approach faces a similar challenge. In theory, it
should be able to dislodge the unconscious institutional assumptions of
different groups by explicitly replacing them with different assumptions:
Assume a political process with competence bundle X, a judiciary with
195
competence bundle Y, and a market with competence bundle Z. Which
should we prefer? Logically, this question rules out the assumption of a
political process with competence bundle Q, R, or S. In practice,
however, any answer is likely to turn to some degree on the answerer’s
internalized understanding of her own normative commitments. If she
understands herself as committed to goal A, partly based on an implicit
assumption of a political process with competence bundle R, that
assumption is likely to infect her response to at least some degree.
Given the seriousness of these challenges, it seems wise to apply the
two approaches in concert, using each as a check on the reliability of the
other. This will by no means resolve all difficulties, but if institutionalists
and normative theorists really talk to one another, it should be possible
to make significant progress. Much hangs on this possibility. Failure
means that even the most rigorous institutional analysis will rest on
highly questionable and largely unexamined institutional assumptions

194. This is a specific instance of a more general problem that psychologists refer to as “biased
assimilation.” See Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of
Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 2098, 2099
(1979).
195. By “competence bundle,” I simply mean an institution’s competencies on the range of
relevant issues, considered collectively.
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embedded in the normative goals it proceeds from. Success, at the very
least, means avoiding this fate. At best, it means reducing or even
eliminating disagreement between normative views that appear
superficially to conflict but in reality diverge more in their implicit
institutional assumptions than in their normative ideals.
Return again to the libertarian and communitarian perspectives on
genetic selection. Despite their many differences, both recognize
procreative liberty as important but not absolute. Given this basic
agreement, it seems barely possible that the two perspectives not only
rest on unarticulated institutional assumptions but also that, when those
assumptions are stripped away, they in fact share the same essential
normative commitment. Call it proper respect for procreative liberty
196
tempered by proper respect for societal interests. If this is true and
both sides come to recognize that fact, it would enable both libertarians
and communitarians to confront the actual, institutional basis of their
disagreement more productively. Even if some normative disagreement
persists, as seems likely, disentangling it from institutional considerations
may reveal greater overlap in the two groups’ goals than had previously
197
been apparent. This, in turn, would increase the chances of bringing
198
them to an overlapping consensus on a single constitutional rule.
These are tantalizing possibilities, which further underscore the
importance of institutions in constitutional analysis. But even in the bestcase scenario, in which libertarians and communitarians converge on a
single goal, there is still the problem of the normative gap. That puts us
back where we started: searching for a method to assess which allocation
of institutional authority will most effectively promote whatever goal the
two groups agree upon. For reasons already discussed, the participationcentered approach can be helpful in addressing this question, but often
the information it provides will be consistent with multiple answers.
There is no a priori reason that this challenge should be any less severe
in the context of relative normative consensus than in the context of
heated normative disagreement. In principle, the conditions for the
normative gap—mismatch between the relevant goal and patterns of
participation, relatively small divergence among institutions, and
imprecision in the participation-centered analysis—can exist in either
case.

196. “Proper,” of course, would need to be understood in the same way by both groups.
197. As noted earlier, the opposite is also possible: disentangling normative and institutional issues
might drive the two groups further apart than they previously appeared. See supra note 52 and
accompanying text. For ease of exposition, I bracket this possibility here.
198. The odds of achieving such consensus are higher where the two sides’ agreements are more
important than their disagreements and where there is enough difference among institutions in the
area of agreement to make one institution obviously preferable.
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In practice, however, it seems distinctly possible that disentangling
normative and institutional considerations will reduce the mismatch
problem, shrinking or even eliminating the normative gap. Consider the
goal on which libertarians and communitarians might be thought, at
bottom, to agree: proper respect for procreative liberty tempered by
proper respect for societal interests. At first blush, this goal seems no
more obviously correlated with the success of genetic-selection
proponents or opponents than are the goals libertarians and
communitarians presently espouse. If anything, the correlation would
seem to be even weaker. Libertarians share many, though not all, the
concerns of genetic-selection proponents and communitarians share
many, though not all, the concerns of genetic-selection opponents. A
properly tempered respect for procreative liberty, by contrast, does not
obviously tip in either direction. On closer examination, however, proper
respect in this context seems likely to translate into something like equal
respect for the interests of all affected persons. For libertarians and
communitarians to come to any kind of agreement, it would almost have
to. Equal respect, in turn, should correlate highly with equality of
efficacious participation in whatever institution exercises decisionmaking
authority over genetic selection.
Where this is true, resolving the normative-institutional entanglement
problem represents an additional and quite promising approach to
narrowing the normative gap. If it is true generally—that is to say, if
disentangling normative and institutional considerations can generally be
expected to produce normative convergence on goals that correlate
highly with patterns of participation—making progress on the
entanglement problem could greatly augment the power of the
participation-centered approach. Whether this is in fact generally the
case is a deeper question than I can take on here. For now, I merely note
the importance of this possibility.
C. Uncertainty and the Problem of Perspective
Yet another challenge, this one without an apparent silver lining, is
the important and underappreciated role of uncertainty in institutional
analysis. The point is not just that empirical uncertainty—about error
costs, decision costs, and dynamic institutional effects—is a serious
obstacle facing real-world officials struggling to make intelligent
199
institutional choices. That is true and important but does little to
distinguish institutional choice from many other complex questions. The
deeper and more distinctive point is that institutional choices themselves
are often strategies for responding to uncertainty (of various kinds) and
thus must be sensitive to changes in uncertainty levels in a special way.
199. See generally Vermeule, supra note 13.
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Consider once again the libertarian position on procreative liberty.
Application of that position to the regulation of genetic selection might
result in several types of uncertainty. On the individual interest side of
the balance, it might be normatively uncertain which values and interests
account for the special importance of procreative liberty. It might also be
empirically uncertain which if any forms of genetic selection actually
implicate those values and interests, whatever they are. Similarly, on the
state-interest side of the scale, it might be normatively uncertain whether
the societal interests offered to support regulation could ever be
sufficiently compelling to override the right to procreative liberty. It
might also be empirically uncertain whether any form of genetic
selection actually conflicts with these societal interests to an extent
sufficient to justify regulation, whatever extent that is.
The logical response is to assign decisionmaking authority to the
institution most capable of reliably resolving such uncertainties. But this
dynamic complicates institutional analysis in several ways. First and most
obviously, which institution seems most reliable will often change—
independently of institutional competence—as relative uncertainties
change. Imagine, for example, that the political process is more reliable
than courts or the market in determining whether genetic selection
conflicts with compelling societal interests. In the face of substantial
uncertainty on this issue, the political process would seem more
attractive than the courts or the market, which in turn would cut against
recognition of a constitutional right, holding all else equal.
On the other hand, if it were both empirically and normatively
certain that genetic selection (or some specific form of it) burdened no
compelling interest, the greater reliability of the political process on this
issue would then drop out of the calculus. If the judiciary or the market
were better suited to determining whether genetic selection implicates
procreative liberty, this shift in uncertainty levels would make the case
for constitutional protection substantially stronger. Indeed, in the
limiting case, if it were certain that all forms of genetic selection
implicated procreative liberty and also that they burdened no compelling
interests, the libertarian case for broad constitutional protection would
200
be something close to a slam dunk.
The upshot is that institutional analysis must be sensitive not only to
normative goals but also to levels of uncertainty about how those goals
apply to particular circumstances. This poses a greater challenge for the

200. I say “close to” because the courts could still in theory invalidate justified regulations by
mistake, perhaps confusing other medical practices with genetic selection or erroneously concluding
that safety and efficacy regulations infringed the right. Decision costs (especially opportunity costs) or
dynamic institutional effects could also potentially tip the balance against constitutional protection,
especially if genetic-selection opponents exercised enough sway in the market that a constitutional
right would do its intended beneficiaries little good.
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participation-centered approach than might first appear. As we saw in
Part IV.B, that approach supplies a wealth of information about the
likely outcomes of different institutional processes. In the absence of
empirical and normative uncertainties about the desirability of a
libertarian right, such information would seem to be extremely useful in
deciding how to allocate authority among the relevant institutions. As we
have just seen, however, the more certain we are about the desirability of
particular outcomes, the easier institutional choices become, quite apart
from the dynamics of participation. On the other hand, if we are greatly
uncertain about when and whether genetic selection ought to be
protected, the information provided by the participation-centered
approach will be of much less use. It is little help to know which
institutions will produce which outcomes if we do not know which
outcomes are normatively desirable. In short, the role of uncertainty in
institutional analysis means that the participation-centered approach is
most helpful when institutional choice is easiest and least helpful when
201
institutional choice is most difficult.
Of course, this dynamic in no way diminishes the necessity of
institutional choice. Moreover, it seems likely to affect any approach to
institutional analysis in some fashion or another. It therefore provides no
argument for abandoning or even necessarily supplementing the
participation-centered approach. But it is clearly an issue that analysts
employing the approach would do well to be sensitive to.
One last complication is worthy of note. Up to this point, I have
discussed uncertainty in the abstract, but of course in reality, it is
particular persons who are uncertain. Who are the relevant persons in
this context? Since our focus has been whether courts should recognize a
constitutional right to engage in genetic selection, the answer might seem
self-evidently to be judges. They, after all, are the persons who will
ultimately decide whether to recognize such a right (albeit as part of a
complex institutional process). But the uncertainty of interest concerns
not how judges should make this decision but whether judges are the
right officials (or courts the right institution) to make it in the first place.
The question cannot, therefore, be answered from the internal perspective

201. The point does not hold universally. As we saw in Part V.B, there are some normative goals
that correlate highly with levels of participation. With respect to such goals, uncertainty about
comparative institutional competence (that is, participation differentials among various institutions)
and uncertainty about mixed questions of fact and political morality (which rule best realizes a
normative goal that is closely tied to participation) essentially amount to the same thing. In such cases,
uncertainty can still be a real obstacle in applying the participation-centered approach. But to
whatever extent that obstacle is overcome, the conclusions yielded by the approach will be of value to
normative constitutional analysis. Obviously, this enhances the importance of the possibility that
disentangling institutional and normative considerations can generally be expected to produce
convergence on goals that correlate highly with patterns of participation. If it can, the challenge
uncertainty poses for institutional analysis becomes much more tractable.
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of a judge. Rather, it must be considered from the perspective of an
institutional designer—that is to say, a person assessing how authority
ought to be parceled out among institutions from a position outside those
institutions. It is by now a commonplace that this perspective, which is
basically that of the normative constitutional theorist, cannot be neutral
on matters of political morality. It must embrace one set of normative
goals or another. Less frequently recognized is that it cannot be neutral
on—that is, it must either take a position on or admit a degree of
uncertainty about—questions of empirical fact or the application of
202
political morality to particular factual circumstances.
Obviously, no institutional designer can hope to resolve all
uncertainty surrounding these questions, normative or empirical. In
many instances, it will therefore be necessary to delegate the resolution
of uncertainty to appropriate decisionmaking institutions. Indeed, as we
have seen, this is an important function of institutional design. But since
uncertainty does not exist in the abstract, the nature and degree of
uncertainty motivating any given institutional choice can only be
assessed from the perspective of a particular institutional designer. To
the extent that institutional designers differ in their assessments of the
uncertainty, those disagreements will often lead them to different
conclusions about institutional choice. Neither the participation-centered
approach nor any other approach to institutional analysis can resolve
these disagreements, which turn on scientific, sociological, and
philosophical, rather than institutional, issues. As such, these
disagreements must be confronted head on, drawing on the expertise of
specialists in the relevant fields. This is another way in which greater
dialogue between institutional theorists and other scholars, who have in
general paid little attention to institutional issues, could improve the
quality of institutional analysis.
An example will help to make the point more concrete. Imagine
that the dispositive issue in determining whether courts should recognize
a broad right to procreative liberty is the magnitude of genetic selection’s
impact on disabled persons and the relationship between parents and
children. Imagine further that, in the face of uncertainty on this issue,
there are good reasons to trust the judgments of legislatures and
administrative agencies over the judgments of courts. Should courts
recognize a broad constitutional right? The answer does not turn on
whether judges are uncertain about the impacts of genetic selection. If
the institutional designer asking the question is certain those impacts will
be minimal (perhaps because the need to use in vitro fertilization will

202. But cf. Frederick Schauer, Instrumental Commensurability, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1215, 1231–32
(1998) (making a similar point in the course of defending value incommensurability as a potentially
useful heuristic for administrative decisionmaking).
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dramatically limit the use of genetic-selection techniques), it may well be
desirable for judges to recognize a strong right regardless of any
uncertainty they personally feel on the subject. Either way, this question
must be asked from a perspective external to the judiciary.
Of course, in practice, decisions allocating institutional authority (or
influencing the allocation of such authority) are not made by idealized
institutional designers deciding once and for all from a position apart
from and above the fray. They are made by many different fallible
persons in a wide variety of institutional settings, on an ongoing and
often quite dynamic basis. In the genetic-selection context, such persons
include judges deciding cases; presidents and senators deciding what sort
203
of judges to appoint and confirm; all manner of political officials, state
and federal, deciding whether to resist judicial recognition of a
constitutional right; and, finally, academics and other commentators
seeking to inform and influence the decisions made by these actors.
To the extent any of these persons wishes in good faith to determine
whether courts should recognize a constitutional right to engage in
genetic selection, she will have to stand outside her particular
institutional position and confront the relevant empirical questions
herself. Quite likely she will be uncertain about many of them, in which
case the question will become whether the judiciary or some other
institution (including her own) is most sensibly entrusted with resolving
those uncertainties. Even in the rare instances where she is certain—say,
that genetic selection will have minimal adverse social impacts—she will
have to ask whether her own certainty (and the institutional choice
following from it) ought to be trusted over the contrary judgments of
other potential decisionmakers. This question will often give rise to its
own second-order uncertainties, and so on ad infinitum. Ultimately,
however, any person in a position to influence the allocation of
institutional authority must make her own judgment, even if that
judgment is to defer first-order, second-order, or nth-order questions to
204
other individuals or institutions, as it often should be.
203. Of course, the proper allocation of institutional authority over genetic selection will be only
one tiny component of the appointment and confirmation calculus.
204. Sometimes, as noted, the person making this call will be a judge. In such cases, her empirical
or philosophical uncertainty as a judge will overlap perfectly with her uncertainty as an institutional
designer. But the perspective of the institutional designer will still be distinct. How she would decide
the case, if given the power to decide, is a different question than whether courts should, in fact, be
given that power. Where a judge is in a position to influence the allocation of institutional authority, as
she generally will be in difficult constitutional cases, she ought to ask the second question first.
Cf. Schauer, supra note 202, at 1231 n.43 (“[I]n circumstances under which I am designing institutions
or dispositions to constrain my future behavior, I exist in the role of institutional designer, even if I am
designing an institution solely for myself.”). The possibility that judges are comparatively bad at
institutional analysis may well influence her answer or cause her to adopt a simple categorical
approach across all cases. But it can be no objection to asking or deciding the question. Where a judge
has the power to influence the allocation of institutional authority, she has no choice.
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D. Beyond Error Costs
One of the most challenging aspects of institutional analysis is the
sheer number of variables in play. This challenge is well illustrated by the
rough participation-centered analysis of Part IV, which has many moving
parts but paints only a static picture of the dynamics of participation at a
given point in time. To the extent that participation differentials
correlate with normative goals, such a picture can help to identify the
relative error costs of allocating decisionmaking authority to one
institution or another. But it sheds no obvious light on the marginal
decision costs of courts relative to other potential decisionmakers or the
opportunity costs of allocating judicial resources to one issue rather than
another (or the opportunity benefits of freeing up another institution’s
resources). Perhaps more important, it also sheds no light on what we
might call the dynamic costs of a decision that any given institution
imposes on other institutions and individuals, who must shape their
conduct accordingly. The same goes for dynamic interactions among
institutions, which may be either salutary or pernicious but will often be
quite important.
To account for decision costs and dynamic effects satisfactorily, any
institutional analysis would have to be substantially more complex than
the one I attempted in Part IV. To actually conduct such an analysis is
more than I can attempt here. Instead, I want to use the challenge of
doing so to highlight the remarkable versatility of the participationcentered approach. Along the way, I shall also note a few limitations
205
inherent in its bottom-up approach to institutional analysis. Once
again, these are general points but they are well illustrated in the geneticselection context.
1. Decision Costs
As to decision costs, recognizing a constitutional right to engage in
genetic selection would require courts to duplicate much of the scientific
and sociological investigation already performed by legislatures and
administrative agencies responsible for the regulations such a right would
invalidate. Depending on how broadly and how clearly the right is cast, it
could also generate substantial litigation, as well as costly uncertainty
among government and private actors about the scope of their legal
authority and legal rights, respectively. Finally, whatever resources
courts expend recognizing and enforcing such a right would represent
foregone opportunities to protect other, perhaps worthier, social goals.
Of course, some of these costs would also attend judicial refusal to

205. See Komesar, Law’s Limits, supra note 99, at 30 (explaining the participation-centered
approach’s “bottom-up” focus on participants in institutional decisionmaking processes in contrast to
a “top-down” focus on official decisionmakers).

COAN_20 (J. GRANTZ) (DO NOT DELETE)

December 2011]

12/5/2011 11:35 PM

A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO GENE SELECTION?

291

recognize a constitutional right, though probably to a lesser degree. The
net decision costs of recognizing a right would thus be the difference in
total costs of decision relative to a rule of no constitutional protection.
Of the various decision costs just canvassed, the participationcentered approach has the potential to shed very substantial light on two.
The most obvious is the volume of litigation a new right would generate.
If the participation-centered approach is sound, that volume should be in
large part a function of the costs and benefits of participation in the
adjudicative process (and the distribution of those costs and benefits
among stakeholders) under whatever constitutional rule the Court
adopts. These costs and benefits, of course, already occupy center stage
in a participation-centered analysis. To predict the volume of litigation
would merely require shifting the focus of that analysis from the likely
legal outcomes of different levels of participation to the levels of
participation themselves. The same is true for the costs of judicial factfinding. To the very substantial extent that those costs include the
parties’ costs of participation—hiring lawyers and experts and the like—
they are already part of the participation-centered calculus. Accounting
for them as part of a comparative institutional analysis merely requires a
slight shift of focus from outcomes to process.
With respect to other decision costs, the participation-centered
approach also has the potential to be quite helpful, but it omits a few
important aspects of the picture. The costs of judicial fact finding, for
example, include not only costs to the parties but also costs to the
broader public in the form of scarce judicial time and material resources.
Such costs are in part a function of levels of participation, which can both
supply courts with needed information and inundate them with
confusing, contradictory, and misleading information, with important
effects on the efficiency and reliability of judicial fact finding.
Participation, however, is not the only important factor. The complexity
of the factual issues involved and the costs of judicial efforts to master
that complexity also matter greatly. These costs in turn are a function of
the competence and training of judicial decisionmakers and the internal
organization, resources, and staffing of the courts. To assess them
requires a top-down examination of the judicial system, rather than the
bottom-up perspective of the participation-centered approach.
The same basic point holds for the opportunity costs of recognizing
a new constitutional right. Setting normative questions aside, these costs
turn chiefly on three factors: (1) the demands that recognition and
enforcement of a new constitutional right would place on limited judicial
resources, (2) the competing demands on those resources, and (3) the
total resources available. We have already seen that the costs and
benefits of participation in the adjudicative process could, with a slight
shift of focus, help to predict the volume of litigation that a new
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constitutional right would generate. With a similarly slight shift of focus,
the costs and benefits of participation in the political process could help
to predict the degree of resistance such a right would provoke from other
government actors. Together, these predictions might shed significant
light on the quantum of resources courts would have to expend to
protect a given quantum of procreative liberty. The same analysis could
be applied to other, competing demands on judicial resources to
determine what the Court would be sacrificing by recognizing a new
constitutional right. Whether and to what extent such sacrifice is
necessary, however, is determined by the total resources available to
courts (and the flexibility of the constraints on those resources). Those
resources are not a function of participation but rather of the hierarchical
structure and budgets—the top, rather than the bottom—of the judicial
system. A participation-centered analysis can therefore shed little light
on this important determinant of opportunity costs.
2. Dynamic Institutional Effects
As to dynamic institutional effects, the picture is very similar. An
imaginative and thorough application of the participation-centered
approach has the potential to shed significant light on many of these
effects, but there are a few important aspects of the picture it would miss.
Judicial recognition of a right to engage in genetic selection could have
an important marginal impact (positive or negative) on legislative and
administrative consciousness about constitutional liberties. It might also
206
further habituate judges to taking sides on contentious social issues. At
the same time, it might further raise the salience of those issues in the
judicial appointment and confirmation processes, with important effects
on the future composition of the judiciary. Finally, and perhaps most
important, it seems quite likely to stifle experimentation in regulation of
genetic-selection techniques (and derivatively, information gathering
about them), depriving policy makers and courts of useful information
about the range of possible regulatory responses and their social impacts.
Of these effects, the participation-centered approach has the
potential to shed substantial predictive light on only one: the extent to
which a new constitutional right would stifle regulatory experimentation.
If the participation-centered approach is sound, the volume of such
experimentation should be in significant part a function of the costs and
benefits of participation in the political process under whatever rule the
Court adopts. Obviously, these costs and benefits are already of central
206. See, e.g., David McGowan, (So) What If It’s All Just Rhetoric?, 21 Const. Comment. 861, 885–
86 (2004) (reviewing Eugene Garver, For the Sake of Argument: Practical Reasoning,
Character, and the Ethics of Belief (2004)) (“As the country accepts creative decisions, they
become more accustomed to such decisions, making creativity less costly in the future, and therefore
more likely.”).
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concern to any participation-centered analysis. To predict the effect of a
new constitutional right on regulatory experimentation would merely
require another slight shift in focus—in this case from an ex ante
perspective that analyzes the dynamics of political participation in the
absence of robust constitutional review to an ex post perspective that
analyzes those dynamics in light of such review. This is the same shift
required to predict political resistance to a new right. Indeed, regulatory
experimentation in many contexts will simply be political resistance by
207
another name.
With respect to other dynamic institutional effects, the participationcentered approach seems likely to have less predictive power. The reason
is fairly simple. The incidence of these effects turns chiefly on the
psychology, social norms, and group dynamics of official decisionmakers
at the top of major decisionmaking institutions, rather than the mass of
participants at the bottom. This is certainly true of the effects of
aggressive judicial supervision on legislative and administrative
consciousness about individual liberties. It is equally true of the
possibility that a new constitutional right would habituate judges to
taking sides on controversial social issues. It is less true of the possibility
that a new constitutional right would raise the salience of social issues in
the judicial appointments process, which depends at least as much on its
reception by the public as its reception by political officials. But even so,
the participation-centered approach has few resources to predict this
reception. The empirical literature on the relationship of the courts and
208
public opinion seems like a more promising starting point.
Notwithstanding these limitations on its predictive power, the
participation-centered approach has the potential to be extremely
helpful in assessing the practical significance of many dynamic
institutional effects. For example, one plausible reason to care about the
constitutional consciousness of legislators and administrators is that such
consciousness reduces the costs of efficacious political participation for
proponents of individual liberties. The same point holds for judicial
habituation to activism on social issues. The costs and benefits of
participation might also provide a valuable lens for assessing the
increased salience of social issues in the judicial appointments process,
209
though the story here is a bit more complicated. High public salience
seems likely to reduce the costs of organization (and hence participation)

207. In counting the stifling of regulatory experimentation as a cost, I am assuming that the
knowledge such experimentation would produce has positive social value. That may or may not be
true in any particular case.
208. See generally James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Citizens, Courts, and Confirmations:
Positivity Theory and the Judgments of the American People (2009); Public Opinion and
Constitutional Controversy (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds. 2008).
209. The point could be extended to the political process as a whole.
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for all groups with a strong stake in such issues. If these costs drop
proportionally more for some groups than others, as they almost
certainly would, the participation-centered approach could provide
valuable information about which groups this dynamic would benefit.
Perhaps more important, the heightened salience of social issues seems
likely to increase the costs of participation in the appointments process
by interest groups with other concerns, which as a result would be more
difficult to place on the appointments agenda. These effects, too, would
presumably be greater for some groups than others, with potentially
210
significant implications for the future composition of the judiciary.
In focusing on the potential of a more ambitious participationcentered analysis without actually conducting one, this Subpart has
necessarily been somewhat sketchy and speculative. But the important
point should be clear. While assessing decision costs and dynamic
institutional effects presents complex challenges, the participationcentered approach is a remarkably versatile tool for meeting them. At
the same time, that approach (like any other) does have important
limitations. A rigorous institutional analysis needs to take account of
both.

Conclusion
The future of reproductive freedom is upon us. Constitutional
analysts have been anticipating this development for nearly two decades,
but until now, their focus has been almost exclusively on the balance of
individual and government interests at stake. This is a vital question and
necessary to the intelligent selection of social goals. But in constitutional
law, goal choice is always only half the battle—if that. The practically
relevant question is not just when and whether it would be desirable for
genetic-selection decisions to be protected in the abstract but when and
whether it would be desirable for courts (or some other institution) to
protect them. To answer the latter requires careful comparative analysis
of error rates and costs, dynamic institutional interactions, and decision
costs, none of which is meaningful without a background normative
theory assigning weights and measures to the relevant variables.
This is a daunting task and one that it will be difficult for judges to
undertake profitably or comprehensively on their own. That would be
true even if a simple participation-centered approach along the lines
described in Part IV were sufficient. It is doubly true in light of the
210. As an example, consider the possibility that the high public salience of social issues like
abortion and gay marriage—at least partially a byproduct of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 113–14 (1973),
and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558–59 (2003)—made it easier for President George W. Bush to
appoint justices hostile to federal regulatory power. Better yet, consider the possibility that the
salience of these issues made it easier for Bush to get elected in the first place. See Coan, supra note
74, at 236–37.
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challenges elaborated in Part V. Indeed, for now, it is possible that
judges may do best by sticking to the framework for institutional analysis
implicit in the Court’s prior decisions, while attempting to apply it more
self-consciously, more systematically, and above all, more comparatively.
For all the shortcomings of that framework, it has three undeniable
virtues: First, it is simple enough for judges with limited time, limited
resources, and limited expertise to administer responsibly (though, of
course, imperfectly). Second, it recognizes that whether to extend the
right to procreative liberty to genetic selection has as much to do with
comparative institutional competence as normative goals. Third,
government officials and practicing constitutional lawyers are deeply
211
familiar with it. In the face of massive uncertainty on most other
relevant questions (and starkly limited judicial capacity to resolve it), the
existing approach may be the best judges can manage without greater
guidance from those outside the judiciary with the time and tools to
212
study the relevant institutional questions rigorously.
Constitutional analysts, for their part, should be devoting at least as
much time and effort to the institutional dimensions of procreative
liberty as they have to the normative ones, while remaining mindful of
the intricate interplay between the two. Rational choice methods like the
participation-centered approach provide a powerful starting point, but
no approach is by itself adequate to all of the complex challenges posed
by institutional choice. A diverse toolkit of theoretical and empirical
approaches is therefore necessary, though all will have their limitations
and in many cases none will be sufficient. Perhaps even more important
is for reproductive health experts to engage with institutionally minded
constitutional theorists and vice versa. All of this makes for difficult and
painstaking work; translating across disciplinary boundaries is a major
challenge and productively integrating the insights and methodologies of
various disciplines is perhaps an even greater one. But this work is
essential to meaningful constitutional analysis.
I hope others will join me in taking up the gauntlet. With luck and
concerted effort, we may yet produce meaningful guidance for judges
and other officials in time to beneficially shape, as well as witness, the
future of reproductive freedom.

211. See Komesar, Law’s Limits, supra note 99, at 163 (discussing the benefits of stability in
institutional choice and the costs of cycling from one highly problematic regime to another).
212. I do not mean to foreclose other possibilities. And the best course may ultimately depend on
one’s normative perspective. But it seems exceedingly unlikely that courts would produce better
institutional judgments at acceptable cost by attempting the sort of complex analysis offered in this
Article.
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